

# From the Streets to the Courts to City Hall: A Case Study of a Comprehensive Campaign to Reform Stop-and-Frisk in New York City



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## About the Author

Gigi Barsoum, founder of Barsoum Policy Consulting, partners with foundations and non-profit organizations to develop and evaluate policy and systems change strategies. Formerly a Program Manager at The California Endowment, she also worked at the U.S. Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) in Washington, D.C. and has more than 15 years of public policy experience at the local, state, and federal levels.

## Editor

Genie Gratto is a mission-oriented communicator and marketer with deep experience in the non-profit world. She has provided editorial support to individual and organizational clients since 2000, and served as the co-editor of Problem-Oriented Policing: Crime-Specific Problems, Critical Issues and Making POP Work, Vol. 3 (PERF, 2000).

## Graphic Design

Matthew Bright is an accomplished designer, creative director and brand sherpa. His vast industry experience includes work for: political campaigns, foundations & non-profits, organic foods, health & fitness, education, technology, and apparel. From print to web to packaging, Matt successfully bridges the gap between creativity and real world objectives with evocative, fresh and effective design. {mbrightdesign.com}

## Photography

Communities United for Police Reform

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# Introduction

**“We’re at a point now similar to 50 years ago with the civil rights movement. The televising of the police dogs and the fire hoses on young people then was a motivating factor and wake-up call for people within the U.S. and outside the U.S. to really face the issues of racial unrest in America. Similarly, we’re at a situation where viewing these videos of incidents of misconduct, of deaths occurring – hard as they are to see – is giving an opportunity to talk about this. And frankly, it’s giving law enforcement the opportunity to step forward, to be accountable, and talk about what is and is not effective policing.”<sup>1</sup>**

**– Loretta Lynch**

Former U.S. Attorney General

Discriminatory policing practices and incidents of police violence are not a recent phenomenon. From the beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1991 to the more recent killings of Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York; Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri; Walter Scott in Charleston, South Carolina; and Philando Castile in St. Paul, Minnesota, civilians documenting these incidents and sharing the footage have raised public awareness about this issue and placed a spotlight on its racial bias.

In 2014 and 2015, as more and more of these deaths made the news, community members nationwide took to the streets insisting black lives matter. People are marching, demanding justice for lives lost at the hands of the police, and seeking solutions to discriminatory policing practices that have criminalized entire communities.

But back in 2011, when the nation was not as keenly focused on these issues, Communities United for Police Reform (CPR), a broad campaign of more than 60 diverse organizations, assembled with support from The Atlantic Philanthropies and Open Society Foundations to address discriminatory policing practices such as stop-and-frisk in New York City. The rates of stop-and-frisk had been steadily rising since the inception of the practice in 1994 under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Those rates experienced exponential growth under Mayor Michael Bloomberg, reaching an all-time high in 2011 of nearly 700,000 stops primarily of Black and Latino men.

The impact of stop-and-frisk is devastating and reverberating. Stop-and-frisk leads to the violation of civil and human rights including illegal profiling, improper arrests, inappropriate touching, sexual harassment, humiliation, and violence.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the systematic use of the practice has contributed to a culture of fear and distrust of the police, the militarization of communities, and the criminalization of residents. The practice has a particularly destructive impact on youth. Stop-and-frisk patterns in NYC neighborhoods mirror school suspension rates. High suspension rates are a contributing factor to the school-to-prison pipeline.<sup>3</sup>

The startling rise of stop-and-frisk, its discriminatory and biased nature, and the devastating impact of the practice catalyzed funders and New York’s advocacy, legal, grassroots organizing, and community groups to find a solution. Many of these groups have fought discriminatory policing and advocated for police reforms for decades, creating New York’s anti-police violence field. Stop-and-frisk is now a widely known term because of their work. CPR was formed on the shoulders and history of the organizations that led this effort.

Those communities most impacted by discriminatory policing led CPR’s timely, effective work. CPR and its partners successfully passed the Community Safety Act (CSA) in 2013, a landmark legislative package that created groundbreaking changes to reform the NYPD. In the process, CPR made stop-and-frisk one of the most widely talked-about issues in New York City and forced mayoral candidates to take a stand for or against it. Though significant and historic, the passage of the CSA was just the beginning of CPR’s comprehensive effort toward achieving greater police accountability.

The experience of a multi-sector, multi-ethnic, multi-population, multi-strategy campaign led by impacted communities and formed to develop and implement a coordinated multi-pronged campaign provides informative lessons learned and approaches for those working on addressing discriminatory policing practices and police violence. The Atlantic Philanthropies and Open Society Foundations funded this case study to inform and support communities, organizers, advocates, and funders that are diligently working to address these issues and ensure communities are both safe and respected.

## A Roadmap to the Case Study

The campaign for the Community Safety Act (CSA) occurred between February 2012 and August 2013, when it culminated in a series of inter-related and complicated events. The campaign utilized a multi-pronged strategy targeting three focal points: the streets, the court, and city hall. This case study attempts to untangle the various events and campaign organizing and advocacy activities to distill replicable strategies and key lessons learned, which can inform the work of other organizing and advocacy groups, as well as foundations looking to support similar efforts.

### Overview of Events: The Summer of 2013

To provide an understanding of the complexity of CPR’s campaign for the CSA, the report begins by providing an overview of the events that occurred in the summer of 2013 around the passage of the CSA and the decision, handed down in *Floyd v. City of New York*, finding the practice of stop-and-frisk unconstitutional. The remainder of the case study is organized chronologically into the following four sections:

#### PART 1

##### **1990 to 2010: Building on the Past**

Describes the origins of stop-and-frisk and its rise, as well as the discriminatory use of the practice and its harmful and reverberating impact on communities. It also explains the emergence of the anti-police violence field in NYC in response to incidents of police violence and killings. In addition, it discusses how the events of 9/11 shifted public sentiment regarding racial profiling, surveillance, and the police department and the impact on the anti-police violence field.

### **2010: Convergence of Players**

Describes how the foundations came together on the shared goal of reforming stop-and-frisk in New York City and how they developed a shared approach and strategy to support the organizations and the campaign. It also describes how the funders strategically used convenings to assess the desire of the field to collaborate and develop a strategy to reform stop-and-frisk.

### **2012: Anatomy of the Campaign**

Describes how the coalition created its “moment” by understanding and leveraging the political and social environment to strategically launch the campaign and pass the CSA. This section also describes the complex campaign strategy by breaking it down into its four key components:

#### **1. Strategic Communications: Changing the Narrative**

- Centralized communications resources and building communications capacity of CPR member organizations
- Messaging and humanizing stop-and-frisk, and redefining safety
- Making stop-and-frisk THE issue and elevating its profile

#### **2. Inside Game: Making the Case**

- Developing internal champions
- Developing an “Ask”
- Leading with voices of affected communities

#### **3. Outside Game: Building Power**

- Organizing and base building (capacity building, Know Your Rights and Cop Watch trainings)
- Alliance building
- Electoral organizing and leveraging the election year

#### **4. Legal advocacy: Leveraging Litigation**

- Supporting the litigation
- Packing the court
- Garnering media coverage
- Linking to the CSA

## Behind the Policy and Legal Victories

The final section is divided into two parts: 1) Findings, and 2) Challenges.

### 1. Findings

The report provides key findings from the campaign, which are grouped into four overarching themes.

#### **CPR took a movement building approach to its operations and strategy by:**

- Leading with impacted communities
- Supporting capacity and promoting leadership of grassroots members
- Promoting cross-issue collaboration and alliances
- Forming a connective infrastructure
- Building power

#### **CPR proactively forced open a “window of opportunity” for the passage of the CSA by:**

- Framing the problem and changing the narrative
- Developing a policy solution
- Understanding and leveraging the politics

#### **CPR had the capacity or “readiness” to achieve its goal with an understanding of the challenges, obstacles, and opponents, and what will be needed to overcome them by:**

- Setting aside adequate time for planning
- Developing a comprehensive strategy
- Creating a multi-sector commitment to specific objectives
- Having centralized campaign staff
- Having adequate and flexible financial resources

#### **CPR leveraged the litigation to mobilize its members, elevate the profile of stop-and-frisk abuses, and advocate for the CSA by:**

- Integrating litigation, organizing and advocacy into the multi-pronged strategy
- Creating the context for the litigation
- Using the litigation to mobilize members
- Participating throughout the legal process

### 2. Challenges

The case study concludes with a discussion of the challenges faced by the campaign.

- **Scope of Issue** – Balancing real policy progress and political viability while not ignoring the more complex issues at hand.
- **Learning and Assessing Progress** - Intentionally creating opportunities for reflection, assessment, and learning across the campaign to inform strategy.
- **Capacity** – Having sufficient resources to engage against powerful interests.
- **Maintaining Engagement** – Keeping members and partners active and engaged post-campaign.
- **Policy Alternatives** – Identifying alternatives to the practice of stop-and-frisk: positive models and policies for effective community policing.

## Postscript

A summary of key events and the changing political circumstances and dynamics since the Floyd decision and the successful passage of the Community Safety Act.

### A Note to Activists

The events that occurred in New York City are unique to that time and place, and New York is fortunate to have a rich field of advocacy and organizing groups. It would be impossible to completely replicate CPR's campaign—this is not cookie cutter work.

What all groups working on police reform and anti-police violence efforts share is they are facing organized, entrenched, and powerful interests. This case study can inform the work of other activists by distilling the lessons learned and effective elements of CPR's campaign to reform stop-and-frisk. Elements and strategies of the campaign may be adapted based on different circumstances.

### A Note to Funders

The issue of police violence and reform is challenging and complicated and may not be directly aligned with foundation goals. However, it is inextricably linked to issues on which many foundations are focused including violence prevention, community health and health disparities, economic inequality, education, youth development, the school-to-prison pipeline, and criminal justice reform. This case study highlights how two foundations made the case for how stop-and-frisk was a contributing factor in many of their foundation's priorities. They then effectively collaborated to support a campaign to reform stop-and-frisk while also supporting the development of an advocacy and organizing infrastructure that would continue to work towards broader reforms.



# Overview of Events: The Summer of 2013

**“We can have safety and police accountability  
at the same time.”<sup>4</sup>**

**- Jumaane Williams**  
New York City Councilmember

## June 26

Just before midnight, New York City Councilmember Jumaane Williams opened the discussion of the Community Safety Act (CSA) at a most unusual city council meeting. “I implore you,” said Williams, who was the lead sponsor of the CSA. “if you have never been a young, Black, or Latino male or female in the city of New York, please listen to us. I implore you, if you have never been LGBTQ in the city of New York, please listen to us. I implore you, if you have never been Muslim or Asian in the City of New York, please listen to us. If you have never been the people we are trying to help and are dealing with these issues every single day, please listen to us.”<sup>5</sup>

Advocates for and supporters of the CSA filled the council chamber and overflowed beyond the gates of City Hall. It was an unprecedented turnout for what promised to be historic legislation. Online, supporters urged councilmembers to pass the CSA; #PasstheCSA trended locally on Twitter.

Community members from across the city and its five boroughs, advocates, media, and even parents of city councilmembers waited to learn if the two bills being voted on that night would achieve a veto-proof majority vote.

Two years earlier, more than 60 diverse organizations came together in a campaign to end discriminatory and abusive policing practices in New York City. The campaign, Communities United for Police Reform (CPR), developed the CSA, a package of four bills to curb stop-and-frisk, increase police accountability, and pave the way for future policing reform efforts in New York City. On the night of June 26, the city council met to vote on two of the four bills (see Figure 1 for all four bills):

- **The NYPD Oversight Act (Intro 1079)** would create an independent inspector general to monitor and investigate NYPD policies and practices.
- **The End Discriminatory Profiling Act (Intro 1080)** would expand the categories of individuals protected against profiling, establish a strong and enforceable ban on profiling by NYPD officers, and give individuals who believe they have been profiled a private right of action.

Each of the 51 councilmembers was allowed two minutes to present their position before the vote.<sup>6</sup>

## June 26 (continued)

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Councilmember Donovan Richards of Queens described his first experience with stop-and-frisk at age 13. “It was an experience that left me shook up. It dehumanized me. It demoralized me,” he said. “Today I’m elected, and I have a chance to do something about it.” Councilmember Helen Foster said she has a high school degree, a college degree, and a law degree, yet she had been stopped.<sup>7</sup>

But the councilmembers were not in unanimous support of the bills. Some appreciated the effort to address stop-and-frisk, but felt the proposed legislation was not the right solution. Others echoed Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s message that the bills would jeopardize New Yorkers’ safety. “I want to live in a safe city that is free from fear,” said Councilmember Eric Ulrich.<sup>8</sup>

After three hours of passionate debate, it was time to vote. One by one in an alphabetical roll call, councilmembers reported their position on each of the two bills that comprised the Community Safety Act. It would take 34 votes for each bill to achieve a veto-proof majority. At 2:20 a.m., Councilmember Ruben Wills announced, “I am the 34th vote, and I vote aye.”<sup>9</sup> The City Council had voted 40-11 in favor of the oversight bill, and 34-17 for the profiling bill. The audience in the chamber erupted into applause.

“In the early hours of Thursday morning, on the floor of the City Council, my colleagues – African-American, Latino, Asian, and LGBTQ – gave powerful testimony from their own experiences, and those of their constituents, about the very real consequences [of stop-and-frisk],” said Councilman Brad Lander, co-sponsor of the CSA. “About kids who grow up fearing police officers, who feel profoundly disrespected, who wind up with records for doing nothing wrong that come back to haunt them.”<sup>10</sup>

Only minutes after the CSA’s passage, Mayor Bloomberg announced he would veto it, calling it a “dangerous piece of legislation that will only hurt our police officers’ ability to protect New Yorkers.”<sup>11</sup> He and Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly vowed to better educate councilmembers in the coming weeks about the bills’ impact on safety. To block the CSA from becoming law, Bloomberg only needed to convince one councilmember to change their vote. Also, if just one councilmember were absent on the day of the vote, the Mayor’s veto would stand.

CPR and its partners had only a moment to celebrate the passage of the CSA before gearing up for next phase of the battle: the override vote. The oversight bill, which had 40 votes, was more secure, but the profiling bill had received 34 votes, the minimum number needed to override the mayor’s veto. CPR needed to hold every vote.

## July 23

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Bloomberg formally issued the vetoes and vowed to use his own personal fortune to convince key councilmembers not to override him.<sup>12</sup> Kelly and the five police unions unanimously supported his vetoes, and the unions continued warning the CSA would result in increased crime and would hamstring the NYPD.

“It is not an exaggeration, nor is it a doomsday threat to say passage of this legislation is dangerous for the city, and that it will turn the NYPD from a successful, crime-fighting, proactive department back into the hesitant and reactive one we had during the crime-filled days of the ‘80s and ‘90s,” said Patrick J. Lynch, president of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association.<sup>13</sup>

## August 12

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As advocates worked to pass the CSA to legislate stop-and-frisk, three class action lawsuits in federal court simultaneously challenged different aspects of the policy. All three challenged the constitutionality of the practice (see Figure 1). The first suit filed in 2008 was *Floyd v. City of New York*, followed by *Davis v. City of New York* in 2010, and, finally, *Ligon v. City of New York* in 2012. Of the three cases, *Floyd* was the most significant because of its citywide breadth. *Floyd* was also the only case to go to a nine-week full bench trial in 2013, coinciding with the City Council votes on the CSA.

On August 12, two weeks before the CSA veto override vote, United States District Judge Shira Scheindlin, who presided over *Floyd*, handed down a landmark ruling:

“In conclusion, I find that the City is liable for violating plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The City acted with deliberate indifference toward the NYPD’s practice of making unconstitutional stops and conducting unconstitutional frisks. In addition, the City adopted a policy of indirect racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups for stops based on local crime suspect data. This has resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of Blacks and Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Both statistical and anecdotal evidence showed that minorities are indeed treated differently than whites.”<sup>14</sup>

The Judge ordered broad relief, including the appointment of an independent court monitor to oversee changes to the NYPD’s training, discipline, supervision, and monitoring practices; a one-year pilot program of body-worn cameras to be implemented in the police precincts with the highest numbers of stops; and a community-driven reform process that would focus on identifying long-term solutions to the NYPD’s unconstitutional stop-and-frisk practices. She specifically included affected communities and CPR in the reform process:

“The communities most affected by the NYPD’s use of stop-and-frisk have a distinct perspective that is highly relevant to crafting effective reforms. No amount of legal or policing expertise can replace a community’s understanding of the likely practical consequences of reforms in terms of both liberty and safety. It is important that a wide array of stakeholders be offered the opportunity to be heard in the reform process: members of the communities where stops most often take place; representatives of religious, advocacy, and grassroots organizations; NYPD personnel and representatives of police organizations; the District Attorneys’ offices; the CCRB; representatives of groups concerned with public schooling, public housing, and other local institutions; local elected officials and community leaders; representatives of the parties, such as the Mayor’s office, the NYPD, and the lawyers in this case; and the non-parties that submitted briefs: the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ, Communities United for Police Reform, and the Black, Latino, and Asian Caucus of the New York City Council. If the reforms to stop-and-frisk are not perceived as legitimate by those most affected, the reforms are unlikely to be successful.”

Within days of the decision, the city filed an appeal with the Second Circuit Court on the grounds that the judge had made serious legal and factual errors, and that the reforms she had ordered would be very harmful to officer and public safety. “It’s a dangerous decision made by a judge who doesn’t understand how policing works,” Bloomberg said. “No federal judge has ever imposed a monitor over a police department after a civil lawsuit.”<sup>15</sup>

## August 22

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Two weeks after the Floyd decision, the City Council convened once again for the veto override vote on the Community Safety Act. CPR and its partners had spent the summer packing the court for the Floyd trial and sending members to councilmembers' districts and offices advocating for the CSA. The long summer had pushed CPR's members beyond their capacity, and it was now down to this final vote, which was even more unpredictable than the last.

CPR needed to hold every hard fought vote gained in June, and that meant ensuring every needed councilmember was present. One city councilmember was overseas on a trip and flying back in time to vote.

"We were tracking the flight to make sure he landed and got from the airport to City Hall," said Javier Valdes of Make the Road New York. "If he had missed his flight, we would not have had the 34 critical votes."

Despite aggressive attempts by Bloomberg, Kelly, and the police unions to swing votes their way, the CSA narrowly passed once again, with 39 votes for the oversight bill and the profiling bill holding its 34 votes.

"This is a victory that comes in the wake of a lot of pain, a lot of hurt," said Councilwoman Melissa Mark-Viverito. "We will be making history today."

In a joint statement, the Community Safety Act's co-sponsors, Councilmembers Lander and Williams, said, "Today, the City Council listened to the voices of reason and passed legally sound and responsible legislation that respects the 4th and 14th Amendment rights of city residents, while providing the necessary oversight to establish better policing practices. We'd like to thank Speaker Christine Quinn, our City Council colleagues, and most of all to the diverse coalition of New Yorkers who worked tirelessly to pass the Community Safety Act. We look forward to continuing working for a safer and more equitable and just New York for all."<sup>16</sup>

Within two weeks of the veto override vote and the passage of the CSA, Mayor Bloomberg filed a lawsuit against the City Council to overturn the law, claiming it "exceeded the bounds of permissible legislation by the Council" and challenging a provision in the CSA that established a strong and enforceable ban on profiling by NYPD officers.

## November 5

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On November 5, 73% of voters elected Bill de Blasio mayor of New York City in a landslide. He had campaigned to end stop-and-frisk, and had promised to drop the appeal against Floyd once he assumed office in January 2014.

Within the first year of his administration, de Blasio dropped the city's lawsuits against the CSA and withdrew the appeal of the federal judge's ruling in *Floyd v. City of New York*.<sup>17</sup> In June 2014, the CSA became law. This victory was a critical step toward broader reforms of the NYPD.

However, the battle over Floyd was not over. The police unions attempted to intervene in the case and have the court ruling overturned. Their action essentially froze the Floyd ruling until all their legal maneuverings were ultimately denied in October 2014.

**FIGURE 1:** Community Safety Act and Stop-and-frisk Lawsuits (Source: Communities United for Police Reform)

## Community Safety Act

The original legislative package consisted of four bills:

- **The NYPD Oversight Act** (Local Law 70) created an independent inspector general to monitor and investigate NYPD polices and practices.
- **The End Discriminatory Profiling Act** (Local Law 71) expanded the categories of individuals protected against profiling, establish a strong and enforceable ban on profiling by NYPD officers, and give individuals who believe they have been profiled a private right of action.
- **Protect New Yorkers against unlawful searches** (Intro. 799)\* would end the practice of the NYPD deceiving New Yorkers into consenting to unnecessary searches; requires officers to explain that a person has the right to refuse a search when there is no warrant or probable cause; and requires officers to obtain proof of consent to a search.
- **Require officers to identify and explain themselves to the public** (Intro 801)\* requires officers to provide the specific reason for their law enforcement activity, such as a stop-and-frisk; and would require officers to provide the officer's name and information on how to file a complaint at the end of each police encounter.

\* Advocates working on behalf of these two bills would later call them the 'Right To Know Act'

## Lawsuits

- **Floyd v. City of New York** (United States District Court, Southern District of New York)  
Filed in 2008, this federal class action lawsuit challenged the NYPD's practice of suspicionless and race-based stop-and-frisks as violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The lawsuit was aimed at making meaningful, departmentwide policy changes. A bench trial was held from March 18 to May 20, 2013. In an historic ruling on August 12, 2013, Judge Shira Scheindlin found that the City of New York had engaged in a years-long policy and practice of unconstitutional and racially discriminatory stop-and-frisks. In her second opinion, she appointed an independent monitor to oversee the development and implementation of a series of reforms to the police, and ordered a "Joint Remedial Process" involving direct input from affected communities and other stakeholders into what additional reforms will be necessary.
- **Davis v. City of New York** (United States District Court, Southern District of New York)  
Filed in 2010, this class action challenged unconstitutional and racially discriminatory policing practices in New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) residences, where tenants are overwhelmingly people of color. The case, related to Floyd, alleged that the NYPD had a policy and practice of unlawfully stopping, questioning, searching, and arresting NYCHA residents and their guests for criminal trespass without sufficient legal evidence of wrongdoing. The stops and arrests were taking place both outside and inside the NYCHA buildings where the plaintiff class members live or visit. NYCHA, which is responsible for the security of its housing developments, had permitted and encouraged these unlawful police practices in residents' homes. The City's and NYCHA's six motions for summary judgment were largely unsuccessful, and the Court certified two classes of plaintiffs at the end of August 2013. After the Floyd trial and decision, the court postponed the October 2013 trial date in Davis. In July 2014, the parties met in the first substantive negotiation discussion since 2010. The parties settled on January 7, 2015.
- **Ligon v. City of New York** (United States District Court, Southern District; Second Circuit)  
Filed in 2012, this class action challenged Operation Clean Halls, a part of the NYPD's stop-and-frisk program that allows police officers to patrol thousands of private apartment buildings across New York City. The lawsuit maintains NYPD's enforcement of Operation Clean Halls violates the rights of residents of those buildings and their guests – largely black and Latino New Yorkers – under the U.S. Constitution, the New York State Constitution, and the federal Fair Housing Act and New York common law. On January 8, 2013, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin ruled in favor of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering the Department immediately cease its practice of unlawful trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings in the Bronx. In addition, she outlined a number of training and supervision remedies. On August 12, 2013, Judge Shira Scheindlin joined Ligon with Floyd for the remedy phase.

# Timeline of Key Events

## 1990 to 2010: Building on the Past

- 1994 • Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and NYPD Commissioner William Bratton implement “the quality-of-life initiative”
- Anthony Baez and Nicholas Heyward Jr. killings
- 1995 • Anibal Carasquillo and Yong Xin Huang killings
- Coalition Against Police Brutality (CAPB) formed
- 1997 • Abner Louima assault
- 1999 • Amadou Diallo killing
- Daniels v. City of New York filed, leads to disbanding of the Street Crimes Unit and release of police stop-and-frisk data
- 2001** • **September 11 terrorist attack**
- 2002 • Michael Bloomberg becomes Mayor of New York City
- 2006 • Sean Bell killing
- 2008** • **Floyd v. City of New York lawsuit filed due to the NYPD’s non-compliance with the Daniels settlement and significant increase of unconstitutional stop-and-frisks**
- 2009 • Coalition for Community Safety (CCS) formed

## 2010: Convergence of Players

- January 2010** • **Davis v. City of New York filed**
- October 2010 • OSF and Atlantic hold first convening of 24 organizations and 50 individuals to discuss collaboration on stop-and-frisk
- August 2011 • OSF and Atlantic hold second and third convenings to develop campaign strategy, goals, and structure

## 2012: Anatomy of the Campaign

- February 2012 • CPR officially launches
- Community Safety Act (CSA) Reform Package introduced by New York City Council Members Brad Lander & Jumaane Williams
- March 2012** • **Ligon v. City of New York filed**
- October 2012 • New York City Council hearings held on full CSA package of bills
- June 2012 • Silent March/Father’s Day Parade
- January 2013 • Ligon v. City of New York decision: the first federal ruling on the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk
- March 2013 • Floyd v. City of New York trial begins
- June 2013** • **NY City Council passes two Community Safety Act bills with a veto-proof majority - the most expansive plan in years to impose oversight on the NYPD:**
  - 1) Establishment of independent oversight of NYPD (Intro. 1079)
  - 2) End discriminatory profiling (Intro. 1080)
- Mayor Bloomberg vetoes both CSA bills moments after they are passed
- August 2013** • **Floyd decision – Federal Judge rules NYPD stop-and-frisk unconstitutional. The court issues a single Remedies Opinion for both Floyd and Ligon. The court ordered:**
  - 1) An independent monitor, Peter Zimroth, to oversee reforms
  - 2) A Joint Remedial Process giving stakeholders the opportunity to shape reforms
- Mayor Bloomberg appeals the Floyd decision
- New York City Council overrides the Mayor’s veto to pass the CSA
- September 2013 • Democratic Primary
- October 2013 • Police unions request to join Floyd case as defendants to appeal trial court’s decision if new mayor decides to drop the City’s appeal
- November 2013 • US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stays Floyd decision
- Mayoral Election
- January 2014** • **Community Safety Act Bills become law**
- Mayor de Blasio moves to withdraw appeal filed by Mayor Bloomberg
- March 2014 • Mayor de Blasio drops lawsuit on the CSA
- July 2014 • Police unions’ request to join the Floyd case to continue the appeal denied
- October 2014 • Police union’s appeal of the decision blocking intervention into the Floyd case denied by US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- NYC’s appeal of the 2013 decision filed by the Bloomberg Administration dismissed
- Making way for the De Blasio administration to negotiate a deal with plaintiffs and implementation of the remedial measures

# 1990 to 2010: Building on the Past

**“For young people in my neighborhood, getting stopped and frisked is a rite of passage. We expect the police to jump us at any moment. We know the rules: don’t run and don’t try to explain, because speaking up for yourself might get you arrested or worse. And we all feel the same way — degraded, harassed, violated, and criminalized because we’re Black or Latino. Have I been stopped more than the average young Black person? I don’t know, but I look like a zillion other people on the street. And we’re all just trying to live our lives.”<sup>18</sup>**

**- Nicholas K. Peart**

The Brotherhood-Sister Sol and Class Member, *Floyd v. City of New York*

## The History & Rise of Stop-and-Frisk in New York City

By 2011, the annual stop-and-frisk rate in New York City had peaked at almost 700,000, with Black and Hispanic individuals making up the vast majority of persons stopped. This was not an overnight phenomenon, but a problem that had been building for nearly 20 years.

Stop-question-and-frisk, more commonly known as stop-and-frisk, is a policy in which police officers stop individuals they deem suspicious, question them, and frequently frisk them for weapons and other contraband. New York is not the only city in which the practice has been used. In other jurisdictions, it is known as a stop-and-search or a Terry stop, after the 1968 United States Supreme Court case of *Terry v. Ohio*<sup>19</sup>, which upheld the constitutionality of the practice, when there is reasonable suspicion, under the Fourth Amendment. Reasonable suspicion involves situations when an officer believes someone has just committed a crime, or is preparing to commit a crime. However, the practice becomes unconstitutional and discriminatory when that suspicion is based on racial and other discriminatory profiling.

Stop-and-frisk arose from the “broken windows” policing philosophy. As the name suggests, it is grounded in the theory that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, it signals no one cares, so all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. Similarly, “untended” behaviors, such as petty non-violent crimes, lead to disorder, the breakdown of community control and social norms, more serious crimes, and, ultimately, to urban decay. According to the theory, policing practices that focus on disorder and less serious crimes can disrupt this chain of events and prevent more serious crimes.<sup>20</sup>

Police departments have disproportionately concentrated the application of broken windows in communities of color and low-income neighborhoods.<sup>21</sup> Some have translated it to develop police strategies that include “zero-tolerance”<sup>1</sup> policies, stop-and-frisk practices, and bias-based policing.<sup>11</sup>

I. Zero-Tolerance Policies: A style of policing generally associated with the full and complete enforcement of all criminal violations, from minor infractions (such as disorderly conduct or public loitering) to major crimes (such as robbery and burglary).  
II. Bias-Based Policing: Refers to police practices that use prejudiced judgments and/or result in disproportionate and unjustified impact based on perceived or actual race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, economic status, religion, age, immigration status, or other factors that are not relevant to an alleged crime. Generally speaking, bias-based policing includes racial profiling and many other types of profiling.

The NYPD has used stop-and-frisk since at least 1994, when then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and NYPD Commissioner William Bratton implemented “the quality-of-life initiative,” premised on the broken windows theory. Under Bratton’s leadership, the NYPD altered police strategies to address low-level offenses that might invite more serious crime.

Police Strategy No. 5, Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York, articulated a reconstructed version of broken windows theory as the driving force in the development of the policy.<sup>22</sup> It stated that the rise in violent crime rates and increased signs of disorder in the city’s public spaces were driving down quality of life in the city. In response, “the NYPD would apply its enforcement efforts to ‘reclaim the street’ by systematically and aggressively enforcing laws against low-level social disorder: graffiti, aggressive panhandling, squeegee cleaners, fare beating, public drunkenness, unlicensed vending, public drinking, public urination, and other low-level misdemeanor offenses. By working systematically and assertively to reduce the level of disorder in the city, the NYPD will act to undercut the ground on which more serious crimes seem possible and even permissible.”<sup>23</sup>

Bratton served as Commissioner for only two years, but the legacy of broken windows policing remained. In fact, Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly expanded the practice, defending it as a means to get guns off the streets and keep homicides down. This was reflected in the rise in the number of stops from 314,000 in 2004 to 686,000 in 2011.<sup>24</sup> Kelly was the longest serving police commissioner in New York history; he emphasized officers’ “activity numbers,” with focus on summonses, stops, and arrests, using them to assess officer performance and drive career advancement.<sup>25</sup> One observer noted, “Under Kelly, the books became bloated with hundreds of thousands of small-bore offenses.”<sup>26</sup>

## Stop-and-Frisk Efficacy?

There is no empirical evidence that supports the effectiveness of stop-and-frisk in reducing crime, homicide, and gun violence. To the contrary, according to a New York Civil Liberties report,\* the data demonstrates that between 2011 to 2014, as stop-and-frisk declined by 93% there were improvements:

- **Murders fell by 33% to a recorded low of 333 in 2014**
- **Shootings fell by 23%**
- **Serious crimes fell by 5%**  
(murder, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny and auto theft)

\*Stop-And-Frisk Down: Safety Up. New York Civil Liberties Union. December 2015.  
[https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/stopfrisk\\_briefer\\_FINAL\\_20151210.pdf](https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/stopfrisk_briefer_FINAL_20151210.pdf)

**“The year [2011] we had the highest number of stop-question-and-frisks... we actually had more crime and less of a reduction. Last year [2014], when we had the lowest number of stop-question-and-frisks, we had much less crime. Let’s get over ‘Stop-Question-and-Frisk’ is not a significant factor in the crime rate in the city.”<sup>27</sup>**

**– William Bratton**  
NYPD Commissioner in a  
2015 press conference



As the stop-and-frisk rate exploded under Bloomberg, so did low-level marijuana arrests, despite the fact that possession of fewer than 25 grams of marijuana was decriminalized in New York State in 1977. Under the law, those caught with that amount are subject to a \$100 violation for the first offense. However, possession of marijuana “open to public view,” is a misdemeanor.<sup>III</sup>

From 1997 to 2013, the NYPD arrested and jailed more than 600,000 people for marijuana possession; about 87 percent of arrests were of Black and Latino people, primarily men, although the rates of marijuana use in those populations were lower than that of whites.<sup>28</sup> The implications are particularly devastating for youth under the age of 25, who make up more than 50 percent of those arrested, leading to their criminalization.

The relationship between stop-and-frisk and marijuana arrests is not accidental. “Marijuana arrests are the fruit of stop-and-frisk,” said Harry G. Levine, a sociology professor at Queens College and director of the Marijuana Arrest Research Project. In the course of a stop-and-frisk, people are commonly asked by the NYPD to empty their pockets and open their bags, bringing the marijuana into public view, leading to an arrest for misdemeanor criminal possession.

Despite the state law, the NYPD has continued to aggressively pursue marijuana arrests. Repeated attempts to change the NYPD’s marijuana enforcement protocol have been made over the years with little impact.<sup>IV, 29, 30</sup> The most recent attempt, instituted in 2014, gives individuals caught with 25 or fewer grams a summons and cites them with a non-criminal violation rather than arrest them on misdemeanor charges.

**“Racially biased marijuana enforcement stretches far beyond New York City – and its pernicious effects extend far beyond the degrading experience of being arrested and jailed. Most serious are the lifelong criminal records produced by a single arrest... Employers, landlords, schools, banks, and credit card companies rule out applicants on the basis of these now universally available records, which have been aptly described as a ‘scarlet letter’ and a ‘new Jim Crow.’”<sup>31</sup>**

– Harry Levine | The Marijuana Arrests Research Project

However, the role of summonses in New York City’s criminal justice system is complicated. The number of summonses issued in the city soared from 160,000 per year in the early 1990s to 648,638 in 2005. As with marijuana arrests, this rise in summonses issued is highly correlated with stop-and-frisk and also disproportionately impacts communities of color – about 81 percent of the 7.3 million people issued summonses during this period were Black and Latino. The summons converts to an arrest warrant if the individual fails to appear in court. There are currently 1.2 million active warrants in New York relating to missed court dates and unpaid fines for misdemeanors and noncriminal violations.<sup>32, 33</sup>

III Offenses can be grouped into three general categories. The most serious are felonies, the penalty for which can include a term in a state prison. Next are misdemeanors, the penalty for which can include up to one year in a county jail. The least serious are infractions (mostly traffic offenses), a \$100.00 fine, plus court costs. <http://www.the3rdjudicialdistrict.com/mcharged.htm> (accessed June 7, 2017)

IV Commissioner Ray Kelly distributed several marijuana enforcement protocols in 2011 and again in 2013 directing officers not to arrest people with small amounts of marijuana in their possession for which the maximum penalty does not exceed unless in public view. The memo stated, “A crime will not be charged to an individual who is requested or compelled to engage in the behavior that results in the public display of marijuana. The act of displaying it must be actively undertaken of the subject’s own volition.”

This creates a vicious cycle. The police justify an increased presence due to increased crime rates. In addition, they frequently cite a “high crime area” as a factor in justifying the use of stop-and-frisk.<sup>V</sup> However, neither the police presence nor the use of stop-and-frisk leads to greater community safety or security. In fact, many residents describe the police presence as an “occupation” and militarization of their community, leading to a criminalization of the residents. In addition, these conditions erode the community’s trust in law enforcement and willingness to call upon them in emergencies.

Youth, in particular, are affected by these policies. “It’s getting to a point you see cops and you automatically know, they’re gonna search you,” said Justin Rosado, a Brooklyn resident who is a member of Make the Road New York. “Every kid is not a criminal. Every kid’s not doing something bad, but the NYPD always treats us like we are.” Youth living in high-crime neighborhoods are vulnerable to violence, but policing practices such as stop-and-frisk and zero tolerance also make them vulnerable to the police and at risk of unnecessary incarceration. This paradox squeezes youth and residents from both sides.<sup>34</sup>

**“The police are not seen as a resource to people in affected communities. People are resigned to this power relationship and dynamic, which is demoralizing and dehumanizing, and does not promote safer communities.”**

**– Zakia Henderson-Brown**  
Malcolm X Grassroots Movement

## The Anti-Police Violence Field in New York City

The community’s struggle against police violence in New York City has given rise to a long history of community organizing and advocacy around police accountability. That history and the relationships between groups that have worked on those issues served as CPR’s foundation.

While each of the groups emerged in response to the specific needs of their community, many grassroots organizations working against police violence collaborated at various points to address increasing police violence in New York City through organizing, advocacy, and litigation. The Coalition Against Police Brutality (CAPB) founded in 1995, was a notable coalition that greatly informed the work of CPR.

CAPB was a small but tightknit coalition of the Audre Lorde Project, CAAAV Organizing Asian Communities, Malcolm X Grassroots Movement (MXGM), Justice Committee of the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, and other groups at different times, including Sista II Sista. CAPB wanted to mobilize grassroots organizations and community members to hold police accountable in New York City.

**The Coalition Against Police Brutality (CAPB) laid critical groundwork for CPR on three levels:**

**1) Created a grassroots infrastructure around monitoring the police, know-your-rights training, and direct action.**

**2) Developed policy solutions that would ultimately inform the Community Safety Act.**

**3) Coordinated street tactics and courtroom tactics.**

V. In an analysis conducted by Professor Jeffrey Fagan of all stops from 2004-2009, police officers cited “high crime area” as a factor in more than half of the stops. (Floyd v. City Of New York. FindLaw.com. <http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1682306.html> (accessed June 4, 2017)).

After New York City implemented the quality-of-life initiative, the number of arrests rose from 198,066 in 1994 to 268,057 in 1995. Most of the arrests were for non-violent misdemeanors.<sup>35</sup> But a concurrent rise in killings by police between 1994 and 1996 proved even more disturbing. The dead included 16-year-old Yong Xin Huang, 21-year-old Anibal Carasquillo, 29-year-old Anthony Baez, 13-year-old Nicholas Heyward Jr.,<sup>36</sup> 18-year-old Anthony Rosario, and 21-year-old Hilton Vega. These killings catalyzed the creation of CAPB.

Three years later, the highly publicized police brutality case of Abner Louima occurred. Then, in 1999, four members of the NYPD Street Crimes Unit, an elite squad of officers whose mission was to prevent violent crime in New York City and seize illegal firearms, killed Amadou Diallo, a 22-year-old Guinean immigrant, in a hail of 41 bullets while he stood outside his apartment building in the Bronx. The officers, who patrolled at night in unmarked cars and in plain clothes, claimed they mistook the wallet Diallo raised in the air for a gun.

The death of the unarmed Diallo was the tipping point, rallying communities around the city. Richie Perez was the founder of the National Congress of Puerto Rican Rights and one of the cofounders of CAPB. Along with CAPB, Perez proposed to the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) that they file a class action lawsuit (*Daniels v. City of New York*). The suit would charge the NYPD and the city with racial profiling and unlawful stop-and-frisk. Grassroots groups, including Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, identified community members who could serve as plaintiffs.

“CAPB used a model we had been working to build for many years,” said Monifa Bandele of MXGM, explaining the rationale behind the collaboration. “Richie talked about a multi-strategy campaign that incorporated organizing along with litigation and legislation and having those pieces inform one another as opposed to working in silos.”<sup>37</sup>

The city agreed to a settlement of the *Daniels* case in 2003, and disbanded the Street Crimes Unit. The settlement required the NYPD to:

- 1) Create an anti-racial profiling policy
- 2) Collect and disseminate stop-and-frisk data to the plaintiffs
- 3) Hold community forums in communities most affected by its stop-and-frisk practices

*Daniels* also resulted in the creation of the UF-250 form, a kind of checklist that police officers completed each time they conducted a stop-and-frisk. The form required officers to describe the reason for the stop and the ethnicity of the individual stopped, among other things.<sup>38</sup> The data collected through these forms ultimately described the systematic and discriminatory use of stop-and-frisk. Unfortunately, the settlement did not provide mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing the NYPD’s compliance.<sup>39</sup> Figure 2 depicts the correlation between the *Daniels* and *Floyd* litigation with the data that helped track the rate of stop-and-frisk over time. *Daniels* also taught important lessons for future litigation.


In addition, the New York City Council, in response to the killing of Amadou Diallo and the *Daniels* litigation, passed the Police Reporting Law (NYC Administrative Code section 14-150) in 2001, requiring the NYPD to report to the City Council on a quarterly basis basic data on stop-and-frisk practices.<sup>VI</sup>

VI. The New York Civil Liberties Union released the data to the public four times a year through submission of Freedom Of Information Law (FOIL) requests.

FIGURE 2:

## Stop and Frisks Conducted by NYPD, 2002-2013

NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Report Database and New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU)



Sources: [http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis\\_and\\_planning/stop\\_question\\_and\\_frisk\\_report\\_shtml](http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_and_frisk_report_shtml)  
<http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data>

## Daniels Litigation Lessons Learned

### The Basis of the Floyd Litigation Strategy

- The importance of remedies and thinking through what you want to accomplish
- Reform work must be focused on permanent, policy-based change with an emphasis on accountability and transparency
- The NYPD will not change voluntarily, requiring coordination amongst various strategies (litigation, policy, community organizing, communications) and strong policy enforcement mechanisms to truly secure sustained and systemic policy and practice change
- Reform must have broad alliances or coalitions to identify the sweeping impact of police practices
- Challenge must be community-led with support from legal and policy organizations responding to community needs

Source: Darius Charney and Annette Dickerson, Center for Constitutional Rights, Stop-Question-and-Frisk Meeting Notes, October 27, 2010

## The Impact of 9/11

The field began to gain traction and used Daniels to raise awareness about discriminatory policing practices and police brutality. They even garnered national and international attention: The United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed its concern over police abuses in the United States, and Amnesty International published a critical report on police brutality in New York.<sup>40</sup>

Then the events of September 11, 2001 occurred and halted progress by police reformers, demonstrating how quickly the political environment and agenda can change. The events of 9/11 tested the field on multiple levels. First, public fears, along with increased feelings of patriotism and public support for the NYPD created a challenging environment in which to advance reforms. Second, the elevated focus and centrality on surveillance as a means to protect the public was in direct odds with the goals of the field, which was to address the discriminatory surveillance practice of stop-and-frisk. Third, the field was still relatively young, particularly in terms of working together. While CAPB was a positive and coalescing experience, groups retreated to their individual organizations and silos.

However, what the anti-police violence field faced was not unique to them. Many policy issues were sidelined and derailed after 9/11. Both advocacy and policy are heavily influenced by the social, economic, and political environment. In advocacy, sometimes progress is maintaining status quo to live to fight another day.

The field was challenged in building public support until November 25, 2006. That day, a team of plainclothes undercover officers shot Sean Bell, a 23-year-old Black man, 50 times the morning before his wedding. The killing drew comparisons with the Diallo incident in 1999 and reignited the debate. Many of the same groups involved with CAPB collaborated to build a direct action response around the indictments and trial, but their work was happening with little coordination with non-grassroots forces. “The problem that New York City was facing was that the organizations weren’t talking to one another,” said Udi Ofer of the New York Civil Liberties Union. “Everyone was doing their own thing, accountable to their own people and not accountable to each other.”

This history and these shared experiences in advocating against police violence in New York City informed the discussion and fueled rapid progress when Open Society Foundations and The Atlantic Philanthropies provided space for the organizations to discuss how they might collaborate across sectors. “These relationships allowed people to experiment around something broad-ranging like CPR,” said Joo-Hyun Kang, director of CPR, about why these organizations were willing to collaborate yet again. “CPR came out of this history.”

### 9/11 Lessons Learned

- Understanding the important role of the social, economic, and political environment as both an impediment and facilitator in influencing policy agendas. This lesson would be later applied when CPR leveraged the mayoral and citywide elections to pass the CSA.
- Understanding public opinion and dominant messages and narratives to be able to counter them. CPR would later address the issue of safety and rights when messaging on the CSA by reframing stop-and-frisk as an unconstitutional surveillance practice that violates civil rights and is ineffective at bringing about safety.
- Acknowledging that at times holding ground is progress and groups need to stay the course until the tide and circumstances change. CPR was faced with this challenge in the aftermath of the shooting of two NYPD police officers that occurred during the planned eleven days of action against the non-indictment for the death of Eric Garner. CPR and other activists moved forward with their already-scheduled protest, despite criticism. CPR understood the context would shift and change with every new incident.

## 2010: A Convergence of Players

**“CPR’s successes did not just happen after two to three years of work. There was a foundation that existed. The communities that worked together had a relationship that predates CPR. We had trust and bridges between the Asian, South Asian, LGBT, and Latino communities prior to the call for us to come together again. Two decades of work led to this broad multi-issue and multi-community coalition. We existed as a network of activists long before 2011, but could not operate as a coalition because we did not have the funding. Funding ramped CPR to the next level.”**

– **Monifa Bandele**  
Malcolm X Grassroots Movement

### The Funder Collaboration

By 2011, New York-based The Atlantic Philanthropies (Atlantic) and Open Society Foundations (OSF) were taking note of the exponential growth of stop-and-frisk under Bloomberg and the changing political climate.

New Yorkers, particularly those in communities of color, were frustrated with Bloomberg’s re-election. In addition, two lawsuits, Floyd and Davis, had been filed challenging the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk. Program staff from the two foundations began to have informal conversations about collaborating on stop-and-frisk. “We recognized this as an issue that disproportionately impacted too many men of color, and it was a huge civil and human rights issue in New York,” said Kica Matos, the Atlantic Programme Executive at the time. “We recognized it was going largely unaddressed, and part of what drove us was the realization and recognition that this was a big problem.”

However, the two funders were concerned about the lack of collaboration among the organizations and the lack of an advocacy infrastructure for the work. “Groups had been working on aspects of police accountability for many years in New York. You had some groups focused on individual cases of police misconduct. Then you also had a group of advocates looking at the Civilian Complaint Review Board and trying to determine if that process should be strengthened and reformed. Then you had the legal advocates working on litigation. NYCLU was collecting data on stop-and-frisk for a while. And there was also work on marijuana arrest research,” said Terrance Pitts, Program Officer at the OSF Justice Fund. “So there were many groups and individuals working on pieces, but they weren’t working in a coordinated way, and they weren’t working with a unified vision, mission, plan of action, and accountability structure. That is really what a campaign requires.”

While stop-and-frisk was not directly aligned with either foundation’s funding areas, the impact of the stop-and-frisk policy had direct implications for some of their priority issues, including racial equity and criminal justice. Matos framed the relevance of stop-and-frisk to her board of directors as follows: “Stop-and-frisk was an egregious issue in New York and had a clear intersection of race, gender, and policing practices that led to bad outcomes,” she said. “I was clear with Atlantic and the board that this was a campaign to eliminate stop-and-frisk in New York, and if we could make a dent here, there was potential to replicate this model and make a dent in other jurisdictions. In addition, we were not going it alone, but we had a willing partner in OSF.”

Both foundations had overlapping relationships with many of the organizations that could be part of the campaign, but neither foundation had previously supported efforts on police accountability and reform. In addition, Atlantic was spending down and closing its doors in 2016, so it was not seeking to create new program areas and was unable to commit to long-term funding. Annmarie Benedict, who took over Atlantic's Race and Criminal Justice Portfolio in late 2012, explained stop-and-frisk as a "specific opportunity that presented itself."

"We had a three- to five-year timeline," Benedict said. "We were interested in stop-and-frisk because we knew we couldn't be in the field for the long haul, but with this issue we could still have impact. We hoped success in changing stop-and-frisk would lead to bigger changes. In comparison, broader work on police accountability was a time commitment that we could not take on because of our lifespan."

OSF was exploring the possibility of police accountability as a new funding area, but had not yet identified an area of emphasis. While each foundation had a different entry point into the stop-and-frisk work, they had a shared understanding of the problem, a shared commitment to address it, and a shared approach to the funding strategy. The rising number of stops, increasing media and public attention, and two pending class action lawsuits made it a ripe policy issue. This narrow entry point into police accountability work provided Atlantic and OSF with the opportunity to:

- **Work on an important and pressing issue in New York City**
- **Build a lasting advocacy and organizing infrastructure that would support on-going reforms beyond the stop-and-frisk campaign**
- **Influence the problem**
- **Have a catalytic effect on other cities and jurisdictions across the country**

From 2011 to 2015, each of the two funders invested approximately \$4 million dollars into the campaign, for a combined total of approximately \$8 million. Resources were allocated to more than 32 diverse organizations and collaboratives, including grassroots and community groups, legal and policy advocates, researchers, and communications experts. Notably, the funders also allocated resources to support CPR staff. In addition, funders provided support for convening and planning, and OSF also funded additional communications strategies to support the campaign, such as the development of a series of videos.

While Atlantic and OSF were the initial funders of the formation of CPR and its work on stop-and-frisk, it is important to note their sizable investment was augmented by the long-term support many of these organizations had been receiving from a range of funders, particularly foundations such as the North Star Fund, New York Foundation, Astria, and Arcus, among others. These funders helped sustain many of the organizations individually and collectively as a field.

## Summary of Atlantic and OSF Funding Strategy

**Convening** – Groups were initially brought together to assess if there was a desire to conduct joint work to address stop-and-frisk. Once the groups agreed, funding and time were provided for a series of planning meetings to develop a strategy and a campaign structure.

**Pooling Resources** – OSF and Atlantic pooled their resources through the Funds for Fair and Just Policing at the Tides Foundation and Tides Advocacy Fund. A targeted RFP process was used to select grantees. Grantee selection was done collaboratively between Atlantic and OSF and was based on alignment with the CPR campaign priority goals implementation plan.

**Grantmaking** – Grantees were provided with general operating support. In addition, Atlantic provided resources for lobbying and electoral organizing. The Atlantic Philanthropies had additional flexibility to support 501(c)4 organizations and activities.

**Promoting Grantee Leadership** – Funders initially played an active role in the development of the convenings and ensuring campaign staff were independent and not housed in a member organization. Once the strategy was developed and the leadership of CPR installed, they stepped back and deferred to the grantees.

**Identifying a Policy Goal** – Funders funded the campaign to work on stop-and-frisk with the understanding that grantees had a broader goal of working on police accountability. For grantees, stop-and-frisk was a result of discriminatory and broken windows policing practices; reforming stop-and-frisk was a step toward broader reforms.

**Supporting Grassroots Organizations** – The foundations provided funding to grassroots organizations, in alignment with CPR's priority workplan objectives. From the start, OSF and Atlantic firmly believed for the campaign to be successful, it needed a strong grassroots component. They intentionally funded grassroots and community organizations that worked with affected communities. Some of these grants were made to collaboratives of grassroots organizations working with similar communities or on shared strategies to encourage collaboration and coordination among those groups.



## The Convening of the Field

In October 2010, an array of organizations and individuals working on police accountability in New York gathered for the first of several convenings. The fragmented field used this opportunity to discuss what they might achieve together to address discriminatory policing. Many members of what became CPR frequently referred back to these convenings as a touchstone.

“Not all the groups would have shown up to have a genuine conversation if this hadn’t been convened by OSF and Atlantic,” said Udi Ofer, formerly of NYCLU. “That is an incredibly important power the foundations have. They play a facilitator role. They can bring organizations together that, for myriad reasons, don’t normally talk or sit at the same table.”

Atlantic hosted the convenings, but both funders took a back seat in the discussions. “We lit the match by funding the convenings,” said Matos. “We were behind the scenes and did not lend our voice.” The funders, however, did make an opening statement, a proposition to the groups that they wanted to support a campaign that ended stop-and-frisk in New York; they asked if the groups had an interest in doing this work together, and, if yes, who else needed to be at the table, and how many more meetings were needed? “We created the space, supported the time, and provided the resources needed to see if there was a there there,” Benedict said. “We told them, if you, together, come up with a plan you believe is winnable, we will fund it.”

The first convening provided time for collective learning, planning, and strategizing. The convening included presentations on stop-and-frisk—its origins, the broken windows theory, research, and data – as well as how the media was discussing the issue, including the dominant messages and key spokespersons. Advocates and organizers who had already been working on this issue presented lessons they’d learned. Groups such as the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement and Justice Committee presented their history of organizing families, and the role of cop watch and know-your-rights trainings. And litigators from Center for Constitutional Rights presented the history of litigation related to stop-and-frisk, the lessons learned from Daniels. There were also presentations and frank discussions on the political realities, challenges, and opportunities of working on stop-and-frisk. The group learned from their history and built on it.

In between the convenings, in the spring and early summer of 2011, a planning group<sup>VII</sup> met to map out a process for creating a “joint plan of action that would transform policing practices over time.”<sup>41</sup> In addition, the planning committee, through a series of conversations with many of the organizations, developed 12 potential policy proposals for discussion at the convenings. Many of the proposals reflected policies developed during previous collaborative efforts such as CAPB.<sup>42</sup>

The group spent the remaining convenings developing an overarching long-term vision, prioritized policy goals, strategies, and a campaign structure.

VII. Planning Group members: Center for Constitutional Rights; John Jay College of Criminal Justice/ Center on Race, Crime, and Justice; Justice Committee; Make the Road New York; Malcolm X Grassroots Movement; New York Civil Liberties Union; and Spitfire Strategies.

While it was understood that the funders were interested in addressing stop-and-frisk, the campaign members saw stop-and-frisk as a manifestation of the deeper problem of discriminatory policing. However, there was recognition that stop-and-frisk presented a timely opportunity to advance policy change as well as strengthen this new collaborative for more challenging work ahead. As a result, the group made several important decisions about the campaign:

- **A broad focus on ending discriminatory policing practices**
- **Expansion of its base to reflect how discriminatory policing plays out along the lines of race, gender, sexuality, immigration status, homelessness, age, and poverty**
- **Focus on stop-and-frisk as a way to address broader issues of discriminatory broken windows policing**
- **Stop-and-frisk would be framed as a symptom of a larger problem of discriminatory policing**

CAPB's experience combining legal tactics with street tactics informed the campaign's multi-sector, multi-pronged strategy, but this time, coordinated staff and resources would support expanding the tactics, organizations, and base. The group had a shared understanding that no single strategy or lawsuit could create systems change in the NYPD. "There was a frank assessment that what we were doing wasn't working...there was a proposition that doing things differently meant doing things together," said Andrew Friedman of the Center for Popular Democracy.

The campaign structure was comprised of working groups (policy, community empowerment, electoral, and research) and affinity groups (legal and communications). The Steering Committee formed the governance body of the campaign and was responsible for coordination of the overall campaign. A "formula" guided the makeup of the Steering Committee – five organizations (the majority of the Steering Committee) based in directly affected communities, three policy advocacy or legal organizations, and one research organization.

CPR's strong infrastructure enabled it to coordinate across the groups and strategies. The campaign engaged on multiple fronts, and quickly adapted and responded to political changes and circumstances. In addition, it respected the diverse members' individuality while allowing them to speak with a single and powerful voice and present a united front.

CPR was most effective because of the underlying values that guided and informed the infrastructure and staff. "It was the principles that informed the strategy," said Lumumba Bandele of NAACP LDF. "Those principles really reflected the centrality of impacted communities in playing a leadership role. That existed throughout all the spaces of CPR. People from grassroots organizations participate on the policy workgroup, because these are representatives of the impacted community, and it was necessary to have them in all those spaces where work plans were being developed. Those principles helped set the stage for there to be some level of accountability to grassroots communities."

Ultimately, what came out of the convenings was a campaign plan that set clear objectives and provided a timeline, policy goals, tactics and strategies, and principles of unity. This document still guides the work of CPR today.

## 2012: The Anatomy of a Campaign

**“The issue was becoming ripe. There were all these things happening that could have been just a blip in time. They could have come and gone and not existed in the public consciousness beyond a week or two in the news cycle. But the campaign seized upon them to ensure they were not just a blip. The campaign made the moment.”**

– Priscilla Gonzalez  
Communities United for Police Reform

### The Moment

By 2012, there were three federal class action lawsuits against stop-and-frisk in the pipeline, with Ligon set to be filed by spring. The lawsuits presented an opportunity to further elevate the issue of police accountability in NYC. This, combined with the all-time high rate of stop-and-frisk in 2011, and the egregious nature and racial disparities of these stops, fueled public anger over the issue—anger that potentially could be harnessed. In addition, the public still resented the City Council for passing a 2008 law that extended term limits and overturned two voter-approved referendums, allowing Bloomberg to run for—and narrowly win—a third term.<sup>43</sup> This was the climate in which the city was gearing up for the 2013 citywide election.

New York City’s political landscape was about to undergo a dramatic change. Voters would elect a new mayor, and, there was potential for a 50 percent turnover in the City Council. There was no viable Republican candidate, which made it highly likely the next mayor would be a Democrat. CPR saw the Democratic primary as an important opportunity to raise the profile of stop-and-frisk, and turn the citywide elections into a referendum on the issue.

While the stars seemed to be aligning for CPR, they still faced two significant hurdles that many saw as insurmountable: the NYPD, considered by many as untouchable, and the police unions. Commissioner Kelly and the NYPD had popular public support—a November 2012 Quinnipiac poll showed New Yorkers approved of the job New York City police were doing by 62 percent to 31 percent, and Kelly held a 68 percent popularity rating. By January 2013, Kelly’s popularity reached an all-time high of 75 percent after the Newtown massacre. While Kelly and the NYPD were slightly less popular with communities of color, fighting them would still be an uphill challenge.

“It’s just the tough nature of working to change policing practice,” said Alyssa Aguilera of Vocal New York. “You have an organized opposition like the police unions—they are really public, and will go toe to toe. Also, the public puts police officers on a pedestal—they are heroes serving the people. It could be tricky to be critical of the police. Now, abusive and discriminatory policing is such a national issue, but it wasn’t the same in 2012.”

In addition, some New Yorkers had never experienced or been impacted by stop-and-frisk. Many saw it as a necessary practice to keep the city safe. Overall, disapproval of stop-and-frisk practices hovered around 50 percent between 2011 and 2013.<sup>44</sup> However, the issue really broke down along color lines, with 39 percent of whites disapproving of the practice, in comparison to 68 percent of blacks and 54 percent of Hispanics.<sup>45</sup> CPR's challenge would be finding ways to get all New Yorkers to understand that stop-and-frisk affected them. "There was a feeling that we were never going to get people in Gramercy Park or the Upper East or West side to care about policing issues as people in communities who are impacted," Udi Ofer said. "Why would someone not exposed to these practices care about something they have never experienced and that is a few miles away from them?"

Recognizing these significant obstacles, CPR still leveraged the political conditions to create a moment and force open a window of opportunity to advance the CSA. "It would require multiple strategies and harness the strength of multiple sectors," said Priscilla Gonzalez, CPR's Director of Organizing.

## The Launch

**"We needed to make a splash to show we are going to aggressively insert ourselves in the political process. We were going to be taken seriously and not be shy from engaging in the political process even while we remained non-partisan."<sup>VIII</sup>**

– Udi Ofer

Formerly with the New York Civil Liberties Union

On February 21, 2012, Communities United for Police Reform publicly launched, and gave the story to the New York Times political reporter who covered City Hall. It was a declaration of their presence and of their willingness to engage in the political process. The reporter covered the launch in an article titled "Stop-and-Frisk Opponents Set Sights on Mayoral Race."<sup>46</sup>

"Two dozen advocacy and grass-roots organizations, seeking to make police conduct an issue in the 2013 mayoral campaign, said Tuesday that they were forming a coalition to raise awareness of what they consider racially discriminatory practices by the New York Police Department... 'We will make it impossible to run for citywide office in New York City without taking a position on stop-and-frisk,' Udi Ofer, the advocacy director at the New York Civil Liberties Union, said, adding that the coalition, called Communities United for Police Reform, would also inform voters about "which candidates stand which way on this issue."

CPR's high-profile, risky strategy was intentionally designed to raise the profile of the campaign and the issue, particularly with decision makers. "We flexed our power by purposely placing this in the media outlet read by people in positions of power," Ofer said.

There was no turning back. Many members recalled the 18 months to come as a blur of non-stop organizing and advocacy actions.

VIII. CPR and its members did not support or oppose any candidate, but operated within the permissible limits of public charities to engage in non-partisan activity, such as voter education, get-out-the vote efforts, issue advocacy, candidate debates, and candidate education.

## The Strategy

No single constituency was going to be able to take on the billionaire mayor and the NYPD to advance policing reforms. Advancing those reforms would also require a multipronged strategy. CPR was developed with those two realities in mind.

For the CSA campaign, CPR created a comprehensive, integrated, multi-tactic, and multi-sector strategy that included grassroots organizing, grassroots lobbying, base building and community mobilization, legal advocacy, legislative advocacy, electoral organizing, and strategic communications.

The overarching campaign strategy and goals is depicted in Figure 3 (next page). The core of the strategy can be organized into the following three components, each of which will be described in this section.

### **Strategic Communications**

Focused on changing the narrative.

### **Inside and Outside Strategies**

Developed policy champions on the city council, while fostering external electoral pressure and power to influence city councilmembers about the CSA.

### **Legal Advocacy**

Leveraged the litigation as a rallying point and as a means to educate and elevate the profile of stop-and-frisk and the need for the CSA.

**FIGURE 3:** Communities United For Police Reform Strategy and Goals

## CPR Vision and Purpose

Ending bias-based policing in New York City, and instituting policies and practices that promote community safety in a dignified, fair, and effective manner that respect and uphold the constitutional rights of all New York City residents.



### CPR Mid-Term Goal

- Substantially decrease bias-based street level encounters with police.



### CPR Short-Term Goal

- Increase the ability of the most affected communities to hold the police accountable and prevent abusive policing.
- Build the political will in NYC among the public and policymakers to advance a more just and humane policing paradigm in NYC.



#### Inside Strategy: Making the Case

- Developing internal champions
- Developing an “Ask”
- Leading with voices of affected communities



#### Outside Strategy: Building Power

- Organizing and base building (capacity building, and Know Your Rights and CopWatch trainings)
- Alliance building
- Electoral organizing and leveraging the election year



#### Legal Strategy: Leveraging Litigation

- Supporting Litigation
- Packing the court
- Garnering media coverage
- Linking to CSA



### Strategic Communications Strategy: Changing the Narrative

- Centralized communications resources and building communications capacity of CPR member organizations
- Messaging and humanizing stop-and-frisk and redefining safety
- Making stop-and-frisk THE issue and elevating its profile

### CPR Driving Principles

1. **Directly Affected Communities in the Lead:** To provide their insight and collective power because even if policy change is secured, conditions will not improve meaningfully for affected communities without a shift in power, and without building the necessary community-level infrastructure/leadership of affected communities into the change that is being sought.
2. **Coordinated Multi-Tactic Strategy:** Coordination among communications, research, litigation, policy, and organizing efforts - grounded in the experience and needs of affected communities, and reinforced by organized community power.

## Strategic Communication Strategy: Changing the Narrative

“The fact that directly-impacted folks were leading the campaign and serving as the primary spokespeople absolutely changed the game. Their stories were undeniable. We brought in the voices of the three quarter of a million people who had been stopped and frisked in 2011 and talked about all the different ways it played out for them. It wasn’t a debate anymore between civil rights and public safety advocates; it was a story of the human impact of policing practices in New York City. That was a huge contributor to our success, and that meant that we had to put resources and time into training our people.”

– Andrea Ritchie | Streetwise and Safe

CPR needed to reframe the stop-and-frisk debate, humanize the issue, educate the general public, and elevate the issue’s profile, particularly in the mayoral and citywide elections. They also needed to position and advance the CSA as a solution. Undergirding the communications strategy were two key principles. First, the campaign’s policy and organizing priorities drove communications. Second, the campaign’s members impacted by stop-and-frisk would deliver the message.

CPR’s communications strategy included the following tactics:

1. Centralized and Integrated Communications Capacity
2. Messaging
3. Elevating the profile of stop-and-frisk

### 1. Centralized and Integrated Communications Capacity

CPR’s comprehensive, centralized communications strategy was designed to ensure the communications work was integrated throughout the campaign and the coalition’s members. Initially, external communications firms handled CPR’s communications function. In addition, the coalition leveraged the communications capacity of some of its larger members, including NYCLU and CCR. Eventually, the communications function was brought in-house and included the following key features:

- **Using Multiple Channels** – The campaign used a range of outlets, including print, TV, radio, ethnic media, and social media, to target specific audiences and decisionmakers.
- **Building Communications Capacity** – CPR members had access to a range of trainings on topics including storytelling, messaging, social media, and how to serve as a spokesperson, as well as support for testimony preparation and on-going communications technical assistance.
- **Centralized Resources** – Campaign staff provided members with fact sheets, talking points, key messages, press releases, sample Tweets, and appropriate hashtags so they could quickly react to changing circumstances, amplify the messages, and respond to mischaracterizations of the CSA. Members were welcome to modify

these materials to make them relevant and appropriate for each organization and its constituency. This meant the campaign could rapidly respond with a unified voice that still reflected its members' diversity.

- **Rapid Response** – CPR's communications staff systematically monitored the media landscape and their opponents' messaging. The campaign's network infrastructure allowed them to inform and quickly mobilize members to respond when necessary to reinforce their messaging and narrative.

**“We have learned a ton about how to write good press releases and talk with reporters. Our skill set has been elevated. We have been able to amplify our messages – messages from the grassroots – that we have struggled to get attention on.”**

– Yul-san Liem | Justice Committee

## 2. Messaging

A critical component of the communications strategy was the message. To help change the narrative on stop-and-frisk, the messaging strategy: 1) expanded the understanding of who is impacted by stop-and-frisk, 2) redefined safety and countered the dominant frames about safety, and 3) humanized the impact of stop-and-frisk.

- **Expanding the Understanding of Who Is Impacted** – CPR took a “big tent” approach to its campaign, advocacy, and messaging. The stop-and-frisk debate had typically been narrowly defined as an issue affecting young Black men. CPR spoke about the impact of stop-and-frisk on a broader cross section of New Yorkers: homeless people; immigrants; those who identify as LGBTQ; members of the Black, Latino, Asian, and Muslim communities; and people of all genders. These populations were unified by their shared experiences with discriminatory policing, and CPR wove their stories and faces into every advocacy action and communications tactic. “CPR press conferences were like the United Nations, beautiful and powerful,” said Juan Cartegena, President and General Counsel of Latino Justice.
- **Redefining Safety** – Supporters of stop-and-frisk, including the mayor, the NYPD, and the police unions framed the importance of the practice as a safety issue. They argued stop-and-frisk was necessary to prevent crime, keep guns off the streets, and keep New Yorkers safe. In the post-9/11 era, messages framed around safety were particularly effective and difficult to counter.



Advocates most commonly countered with the message that stop-and-frisk violates fundamental civil rights. While true, this set up a binary debate between civil rights and law and order advocates—civil rights vs. safety—and excluded the community and the human impact from the narrative.

CPR turned the messaging on its head by affirming safety was important, but explaining how discriminatory policing practices made communities less safe. The data supported this frame: fewer than 1.5 percent of stops resulted in the recovery of a gun, and nine out of ten resulted in no arrest or summons. This approach rejected the false dichotomy between public safety and police accountability. CPR also advanced the message that effective policing is respectful policing. This strong message appealed to all audiences, but also spoke directly to impacted communities. This messaging was woven throughout their work; even the name of the legislative package, the Community Safety Act, reinforced the safety narrative.

## CPR's Core Message on Stop-and-Frisk

- Discriminatory policing practices like stop-and-frisk are ineffective in reducing crime and are making **ALL** New Yorkers less safe.
  - Discriminatory policing practices are causing harm to individuals and communities.
  - Effective policing is respectful policing.
- 
- **Humanizing the Harm** – The NYPD took the position that stop-and-frisk was not harmful for those not doing anything wrong. Their narrative assumed if an innocent person is stopped, it is a minor inconvenience individuals should be willing to assume for the sake of public safety. CPR effectively countered two critical points in this message. First, they avoided the innocence vs. guilt frame, which placed judgment on the individual. Instead, they described the “wrongful” nature of stop-and-frisk, thereby placing emphasis on the ineffective and harmful practice itself.

IX. The stipulations in Daniels required the NYPD to provide CCR with quarterly information until December 31, 2007. In 2007, the NYCLU submitted a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request seeking stop data. The NYCLU subsequently filed for an Article 78 review of the NYPD's denial of its request, and was granted the right to access the NYPD's full electronic databases concerning stop-and-frisk, with identifying information redacted (see In the Matter of New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Police Department 866 N.Y.S.2d 93, 2008).

Second, CPR addressed the “inconvenience” of the practice. Using data the Daniels settlement mandated the NYPD to report,<sup>ix</sup> CPR demonstrated the broad impact of stop-and-frisk in terms of the sheer numbers of stops and its discriminatory targeting of people of color, as well as the fecklessness of the practice in bringing about safety. This data provided the foundation for all their messaging:<sup>47,48</sup>

- **Between 2004 and 2012, the NYPD conducted 4.4 million stops**
- **In 2004, the NYPD conducted 314,000 stops. By 2011, the practice reached its height with 686,000 stops – a 14% increase from 2010, and a 603% increase since 2002, Bloomberg’s first year in office**
- **In 2010, New York City’s resident population was roughly 23% Black, 29% Latino, and 33% white**
- **In 2011, there were more stops of young Black men than there were young Black men living in New York City**
- **52% of all stops were followed by a frisk for weapons**
- **1.5% of these frisks resulted in the discovery of a weapon**
- **6% of all stops resulted in an arrest**
- **6% of all stops resulted in a summons**
- **88% of the 4.4 million stops resulted in no further law enforcement action**
- **52% of the 4.4 million individuals stopped were Black, 31% were Latino, and 10% were white**

**“Every person of color in the city knew these numbers before they came out. But the numbers made it impossible for the rest the city not to see, too.”<sup>49</sup>**


– **Djibril Toure** | Malcolm X Grassroots Movement

CPR also effectively humanized the data and made real its detrimental impact by using representatives of affected communities as the face of the campaign in stories, at press conferences, in the media, in testimony, and as plaintiffs. In addition, they developed an OSF-funded video campaign called “Where I Am Going” (<http://www.wheremgoing.org>). The video campaign featured three short documentaries that provide a glimpse into the lives of ordinary New Yorkers—a teenager, a clergyman, and a police officer—who’ve experienced stop-and-frisk. The videos got close to 200,000 views and were shared more than 7,000 times.<sup>50</sup>

Cheryl Contee of Fission Strategies, a communications firm, said members of the de Blasio campaign must have viewed the videos, too. “If you look at de Blasio’s signature campaign commercial that starred his son Dante – there is a real relationship between how Dante talks about the New York he wants to live in and the way that Kaseim, our teen in the video, did,” Contee said. “Getting that level of penetration was seen as one of the hallmark successes of the campaign.”

**“They redefined it successfully, by using data we’re required to produce, the advocates managed to reframe the debate over the stop-and-frisk policy as a numbers-oriented calculation of how often the police interactions resulted in arrests or summonses.”<sup>51</sup>**

– Paul J. Browne | NYPD Chief Spokesman



### 3. Making Stop-and-Frisk the Issue

CPR very effectively interjected the issue of stop-and-frisk into the citywide elections and, in particular, into the mayoral race. CPR ensured candidates took a position on stop-and-frisk as well as on the pending CSA, and informed voters about the candidates' stance on them through candidate forums, questionnaires, and through the media.

"This was a highly effective strategy because these races get day-to-day coverage," Mandela Jones, CPR's Communications Director explained. "The campaign did a good job at elevating the issue so that it became the issue. That was about being quick and hyper-aggressive, and going out to the media. We not only pushed our message, but were in touch with media all the time."

**"New York's Democratic Mayor Bill de Blasio was elected on a campaign that rejected controversial police tactics like stop-and-frisk, an outgrowth of Broken Windows policing that flourished under the previous administration. The tactic disproportionately targeted young Black and Latino men for random stops and searches. De Blasio's commitment to undoing stop-and-frisk helped to solidify his support among Black and brown voters – many felt he offered hope of a paradigm shift in the way the city's poorer communities would be policed. They all but carried him into City Hall on their shoulders."<sup>56</sup>**

– Trymaine Lee | MSNBC

During the summer leading up to the elections, the City Council was debating CSA, and plaintiffs were litigating Floyd. As a result, stop-and-frisk, the CSA, and the Floyd litigation and decision all became fodder for the candidates and the elections. For example, a Huffington Post article provided an infographic that displayed each candidate's stance on what they described as "the biggest campaign issue of this election cycle." It included the two bills that comprised the CSA – the inspector general bill and racial profiling bill – and the Floyd federal monitor. The article said, "As the stop-and-frisk debate brings up big questions—about security, liberty, gun control, racial profiling, and police accountability—it shines light on each candidate's vision for the city."<sup>52</sup>

Ultimately, stop-and-frisk became a central, defining issue in the election and a cornerstone of candidate Bill de Blasio's campaign. One commentator described it as a "referendum on the legacy and tactics of police commissioner Kelly, especially his controversial use of stop-and-frisk."<sup>53</sup> From the Democratic primaries to the main election, every contender expressed a stance on the practice. All the Democratic candidates criticized the practice, but de Blasio positioned himself as a staunch opponent of stop-and-frisk. Only De Blasio came out in favor of the Community Safety Act, "a distinction he repeatedly touted in TV ads and in debates—and which some credited for his jump in the polls."<sup>54</sup> In September, as the primary approached, de Blasio was not leading the polls. Then he released an ad featuring his son, Dante, talking about policing. "He is the only one who will end a stop-and-frisk era that unfairly targets people of color," Dante de Blasio said in the ad. "Bill de Blasio will be a mayor for every New Yorker, no matter where they live or what they look like, and I'd say that even if he weren't my Dad." After the ad's release, de Blasio's poll numbers underwent a sea change.<sup>55</sup>

De Blasio's opposition to stop-and-frisk, and his promise to reform discriminatory policing practices, garnered him overwhelming minority support, and became the central reason voters elected him. He won 96 percent of the Black vote and 87 percent of the Latino vote.<sup>57,58,59</sup>

## Inside Game: Making The Case

**“Part of what allowed this to be successful is the inclusion of impacted communities who could go back to their respective spaces and demand that their city council representatives vote the right way. It was more than a lobbying strategy. It was the residents who said, we represent your district, we are the impacted community, we are the folks that are being policed in a discriminatory manner and we are demanding that you vote this way on it. That was significant. It wasn’t just a few people, it was a citywide campaign that had national resonance.”**

– **Lumumba Bandele** | NAACP LDF

CPR deftly wove and leveraged an inside and outside strategy that advanced the narrative that stop-and-frisk was making New Yorkers less safe, and the solution was passage of the CSA. As part of that strategy, CPR organized and mobilized thousands of New Yorkers while organizing around the nine-week Floyd trial. The members also took their message to city councilmembers, lobbying on behalf of the CSA. The combination of tactics that comprised the inside and outside strategy is the hallmark of the campaign’s success.

The Inside game was comprised of three fundamental tactics:

1. Developing internal champions within the city council
2. Developing and having prepared a legislative “ask” and policy solution
3. Leading with the voices and stories of affected communities to decisionmakers.

### 1. Developing Internal Champions

Councilmembers Jumaane Williams and Brad Lander, who became co-sponsors of the CSA, shared similar goals and had a strong working relationship. They both represented districts in Brooklyn, New York’s borough with the highest rate of stop-and-frisk, and served as natural allies for CPR.

For Williams, stop-and-frisk was a personal issue. While participating in the West-Indian American Day Parade on Labor Day 2011, police officers handcuffed and arrested him for being on a barricaded part of the sidewalk, despite his showing credentials permitting him to be at that location.<sup>60</sup> But Williams also co-chaired the city council’s Task Force to Combat Gun Violence, so he shared interest with the NYPD to get guns off the street and reduce gun violence. He leveraged this to highlight the fact that the data demonstrate that roughly 1 percent of stops recover a gun. “We are not for no policing, we are for better policing,” Williams said. “Stop-question-and-frisk has been ineffective in lowering shootings.”<sup>61</sup>

Landers, a strong progressive, saw the need to address the rise in the number of stops, but he was also very interested in advancing legislation to address surveillance issues in the Muslim community. He had been working with Muslim advocates and the Brennan Center to develop an inspector general bill. For him, CPR brought a broad base of support that could help advance the inspector general bill beyond the Muslim advocates alone. In addition, he saw this as an opportune time to advance the CSA because of the strong progressive infrastructure that had been laid by the Democratic Party and the Working Families coalition. “There is a very powerful effect when the stars align in terms of the opportunities,” Landers said. “The legal goings-on and policy goings-on and the ripeness of the issue—there was a progressive caucus that was open to moving the bills. It was a perfect storm, and when that storm can be recognized, it is powerful and also powerful to breaking down the various facets to attacking the problem.”

“There was legislative will—we had a configuration within the City Council of people who were allies with our organizations and also had the will to move this,” described Monifa Bandele of MXGM. CPR worked closely with both councilmembers to build a veto-proof majority.

CPR was able to build a strong and trusting relationship with both legislators because the coalition demonstrated commitment and principle but also political understanding and strategic savvy. CPR had an aggressive policy ask, but also understood the importance and need for follow-through. Members of the CPR worked closely together to provide councilmembers with data, information, testimony, experts, and other resources that informed their work to navigate the bills through the council.

**“CPR was a coalition of people who, while deeply principled, were going to push and not settle, but also understood how the world works and were willing to compromise. We are going to fight, there are deals we will not take, we are not desperate for any deal, but we are also not so naïve to come in and say we are going to get everything the way we wanted or else it’s a sell-out. You can’t do something like this as an elected official if you don’t have confidence and trust with the coalition partners.”**

**– Councilmember Brad Lander** | New York City Council

## 2. Developing An “Ask”

A key element of the campaign’s effectiveness was that CPR had a policy solution ready to go, “We filled a vacuum in a moment when no one was thinking about what the legislative solution should be,” said Javier Valdes from Make the Road New York. “When they wanted to tackle the issue, we were ready with the legislation.”

CPR had an ambitious “ask.” They brought the CSA, which was originally four bills, to their city council partners. In the course of discussions, only two bills advanced. While some members expressed disappointment about this, everyone understood how important it was to pass something substantive and to build power.

Some were concerned the opposition would attempt to divide the coalition by pitting those who were concerned about the surveillance issue against those concerned about the stop-and-frisk issue. However, CPR had coalesced these constituencies in two ways. First, it defined stop-and-frisk as an issue that impacts a broad swath of New Yorkers, and built its membership to reflect that diversity of impact. Second, CPR defined stop-and-frisk as a manifestation of discriminatory policing, and surveillance was yet another form of discriminatory policing. In addition, CPR members widely agreed that an inspector general was needed as a watchdog over the NYPD, giving that bill broad support. In fact, the organizations working with Muslim communities had already been working with the Brennan Center to develop legislative language for the inspector general bill. CPR was willing to bring its own legislation to the table to merge with something that could be more powerful together than as separate bills. This all underscored the importance of broad-based, vocal, united support for the passage of the CSA. However, it also highlighted the challenges in maintaining a united coalition in the face of well-resourced and unified opposition.

**“The recent passage of the Community Safety Act proves that diverse coalitions can defeat the politics of divide-and-conquer... That’s the real beauty of the coalition-building, cross-alliance politics embodied in the CPR: it generates change from within, but also from without. Especially considering what the campaign was up against, from a vengeful mayor to a police union willing to lie through its teeth, the change the CSA will provide for the most affected communities is significant.”<sup>62</sup>**

– Aviva Stahl | The Nation

## 3. Leading with Voices of Affected Communities to Decisionmakers

The communities and individuals most affected described their experience with stop-and-frisk, and were present at every opportunity. CPR’s Grassroots organizations brought their members to speak with legislators, to provide testimony, and to pack the hearings. “The value of the voices of people experiencing the problem was just consistently powerful and resonated so deeply with so many people in the city,” said Councilman Lander.

Their stories not only made stop-and-frisk real to elected officials, but also depicted the discriminatory and abusive nature of the practice and its tremendously corrosive effect. The youth, women, members of the LGBTQ community, people who were homeless, immigrants, and Muslims who came to tell their stories from across New York City showed the problem’s larger scope. United by their experience with stop-and-frisk and support of the CSA, these individuals were constituents of these councilmembers, and they were flexing their power en masse.

## Outside Game: Building Power

The NYPD already had substantial influence and media reach, which meant CPR had work to do to create both the political and public will for the CSA. The inside strategy was designed to change political will, but, particularly in this election year, this effort required an outside strategy to exert additional pressure. Advocates and organizers would have to build political will district by district and one councilmember at a time.

They also had to build public will on the ground in communities. While the communications strategy created an “air” campaign that worked to set the context and narrative, a “ground” campaign was needed to organize, engage, and mobilize a broad swath of New Yorkers.

CPR’s outside strategy, which complemented the other strategies, was comprised of three primary coordinated tactics:

1. Organizing, which included capacity building, using Know Your Rights and CopWatch trainings, and base building
2. Alliance building with power brokers and other constituencies
3. Electoral organizing and strategically leveraging the election year

### 1. Organizing

- **Capacity Building** – CPR’s theory of change and strategy centered on building the capacity of impacted communities to hold police accountable and to organize and advocate for reforms. To achieve that, CPR provided members with a range of training to build their leadership, knowledge, advocacy and communications skills, and political power. Members could also draw upon the expertise of the array of CPR members, as well as the knowledgeable staff who provided on-going technical assistance. The diversity and skillset of CPR created a valuable network of expertise to which grassroots organizations and other coalition members would otherwise not have had access.

CPR was not a top-down structure that “mobilized” members, but was instead a collaborative effort that prioritized those most impacted. By working to build members’ capacity, CPR ensured grassroots organizations working with impacted communities could equally engage in all facets of the campaign, from the development of the strategy to the legislation. In fact, CPR’s structure required grassroots organizations co-chair each of the working groups and serve on the steering committee. This ensured grassroots organizations were involved in the development of the CSA, understood what the CSA was proposing, and took ownership of it. This ownership enabled them to “advocate for it, sell it to politicians, and sell it on the ground,” said Monifa Bandele.

**“Young people from Streetwise and Safe were part of the naming and drafting of the statute, of advocating for it, testifying for it, having meetings with councilmembers about it, because of the principles of having directly impacted people in the room and making sure the conversations were structured in such a way that that was possible.”**

– **Andrea Ritchie** | Streetwise and Safe



- **Know Your Rights and Cop Watch Trainings** – These trainings had been used by organizing groups—particularly the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement in NYC—for decades to empower residents to protect themselves against incidents of discriminatory and abusive policing. CopWatch taught community members how to document incidents of discriminatory policing. Organizers understood these trainings were also an important means to educate and engage communities on police accountability issues. Additionally, organizers used the trainings to collect stories on police abuse and build the base for the CSA, as well as for the Floyd trial.

- **Base Building** – CPR helped build power and demonstrate power through its grassroots and community members. It had to demonstrate broad support for the CSA to be able to influence city councilmembers, so grassroots and community organizations each focused within their individual communities to organize and build the base of support for the CSA and the Floyd trial. Through CPR, they joined their collective bases and magnified their impact. CPR itself did not build the base, but by serving as a coordinating entity, it was able to coalesce the power of its broad membership and, as a result, engage, organize, and mobilize thousands of diverse constituencies across the city. This network effect reflected CPR’s structure and diversity of membership, particularly the presence and integration of grassroots organizations.

**“During August and July 2013, when we were doing the Council visits to push for CSA, we were also doing a lot of Know Your Rights trainings, so we had the base to move and support the bills. The Know Your Rights trainings we got funding to do helped us build a base of support for the legislation. The Community Empowerment and Policy working groups worked hand-in-hand, so when we needed to move something, we had a base to move..”**

– Cathy Dang | CAAAV

## 2. Alliance Building

CPR’s broad, diverse campaign was new and untested when it went up against considerable organized opposition that included Mayor Bloomberg, Commissioner Kelly, the NYPD, and the police unions. “We were up against significant opposition with very significant resources that very much outweigh us,” said Kang. “Any time any police commissioner speaks about anything, they have the megaphone of all New York City’s traditional media, which also has national influence.”

Bloomberg, a vociferous opponent of the CSA, had no qualms about using his considerable wealth and that of his political action committee (PAC) to threaten councilmembers running for re-election. He and his PAC wielded considerable influence trying to get members who supported the CSA to vote against the veto override. A source close to the Mayor reported to the New York Post, “The mayor believes actions have consequences, and [he] certainly hasn’t ruled out holding members accountable for their votes.”<sup>63,64</sup>

The police unions were also putting pressure on councilmembers, sending out mailings, leafleting districts, and even revoking some endorsements.<sup>65</sup> “If the City Council votes to override Mayor Bloomberg’s vetoes of the anti-police-profiling bill, it will have a chilling effect on policing and public safety—and also on the future of some council members,” said Edward D. Mullins, president of the Sergeants Benevolent Association (SBA). “In the event of an override, the SBA will devote \$250,000 and a serious amount of its members’ time to defeating some of the incumbents who voted in favor of the bill. We are going to target two or three of the weakest candidates out there, and we are going to take their seats.”<sup>66</sup>

To counter this opposition, CPR partnered with the labor unions, including 1199 SEIU Healthcare Workers East, one of the most powerful unions in New York, with influence in the City Council, as well as 32BJ SEIU, which represents property service workers. An additional ten unions also endorsed the CSA. Though stop-and-frisk was not a traditional labor issue, it directly impacted union members and members' children. For example, Ramarley Graham was an 18-year-old African American teenager whose mother was a member of 1199. Graham was shot and killed in his apartment in 2012, in front of his grandmother and 6-year-old brother by an NYPD officer who entered into Ramarley's home without a warrant or legal justification. The NYPD initially alleged he had a gun, but Ramarley was unarmed.

**“These are not the types of bills that you can have one organization do on their own. They needed a broad coalition like the one CPR had. There had been other attempts in the past to reform the NYPD. Had there not been a coalition effort, there would not have been an override.”**

– **Lillie Carino**  
1199 SEIU Healthcare Workers East

The unions also helped organize a silent march on Father's Day in 2012, in collaboration with the National Action Network and the NAACP. CPR turned out more than 1,000 of its members. Tens of thousands of New Yorkers of all backgrounds and ethnicities silently marched from Harlem to the Mayor's home on the Upper East Side carrying signs saying, “Stop Racial Profiling: End Stop-and-Frisk.” The massive turnout of a broad cross-section of New Yorkers visibly demonstrated the public's increasing discontent with the discriminatory practice. Marchers included nearly 300 civil rights organizations including those representing the LGBTQ, Jewish, Arab American and Muslim, Asian, and immigrant communities, as well as those representing children and youth. The field of Democratic mayoral candidates also marched. The event represented an important turning point in the stop-and-frisk debate.

Councilmember Williams spoke before the march began, saying, “We are black, white, Asian, LGBT, straight, Jewish, Muslim, and Christian. Mayor Bloomberg has been our great uniter. We've been screaming loudly, and he hasn't heard us, but hopefully he'll hear the deafening silence.”<sup>67</sup>

The silent demand and rallying cry of the march was the passage of the CSA. CPR had provided a policy solution around which people could organize. The moment galvanized the campaign and indicated CPR's knowledge and political savvy was paying off—political will was building for the CSA and for police accountability. The New York Times reported on the march, and the article said, “Sunday's event marks its [stop-and-frisk] transformation into a central political issue.”<sup>68</sup>

## At the Intersection of Two Issues

A group of 35 LGBTQ organizations developed and submitted a sign-on letter to city councilmembers urging them to override the mayoral veto. That letter called passage of the CSA an LGBTQ issue because of the impact of discriminatory policing on LGBTQ youth of color, transgender women of color, and gay men of color. The letter noted the passage of the CSA would be a historic moment for the LGBTQ community because it would create the first enforceable ban on profiling based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The CSA passed the same day the Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the law blocking federal recognition of gay marriage.

“For a lot of us, there was one policy change [the CSA] that was actually going to be more meaningful to people of color on the street every day. This was the other history that was made that day.” - Andrea Ritchie, Streetwise and Safe

### 3. Electoral Organizing and Leveraging the Election Year

CPR implemented its strategy during the citywide elections, when every city council seat—and the mayorship—was up for grabs. This timing was key to its ability to advance the CSA. By forcing the mayoral candidates to take a position on stop-and-frisk and the CSA, CPR built tremendous political will and pressure. However, the bottom line remained: They needed 34 city council votes for the veto-proof majority, and they needed to hold those votes for the override.

“The political stakes were high for the councilmembers facing competitive re-election campaigns,” said Javier Valdes of Make the Road New York. “They knew if they voted against the CSA, the vote would be used against them.” A large vocal—and voting—base of constituents could help influence a member’s vote. Even without directly backing any candidates, CPR wielded electoral power to obtain votes for the CSA, and hold veto override votes.

CPR partnered with the labor unions to develop individual strategies for each city councilmember. They identified who supported the measures and who might be swing votes, then focused their advocacy accordingly. In more than 20 districts, CPR’s grassroots organizations and their labor partners went to work. Member organizations and unions that had relationships with or were in the district of a councilmember would take the lead and “adopt” that member. They assigned small committees to contact some councilmembers regularly and frequently to ensure their vote was held. CPR members used every possible tactic including lobby days, meetings, calls and robocalls, petitions, in-district advocacy and actions, in-district leafleting, neighborhood canvassing and door knocking, and advertising in targeted districts. CPR members also registered voters in certain districts.

CPR advocated to influence councilmembers, but also to show councilmembers supporting the CSA that they had cover if they took on this high-profile issue. This was particularly important for those feeling the opposition’s pressure. Mark Weprin, who represented Queens, was one of those who wanted to be able to justify his vote. “I have no beef with the mayor,” Weprin said. “I have nothing but the utmost respect for the Police Department. I am just representing the best interests of my constituents. My conscience and my constituents and the City of New York require me to support this bill because these reforms improve a system that has been flawed.”

**“It’s good to rally outside an elected official’s office, canvass, phone bank, and say ‘vote this way or else.’ But if you don’t have a set of actors who have demonstrated that there is an ‘or else,’ officials don’t pay nearly as much attention. There are kinds of advocacy that elected officials will pay attention to, but they know in the back of their minds won’t have any electoral consequence, and the kinds of advocacy that will have electoral consequence.”**

– **Councilmember Brad Lander**  
New York City Council

## Legal Advocacy: Leveraging Litigation

The United States District Court, which heard the federal class action lawsuit *Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al.*, is located directly across the street from the New York City Police Department at One Police Plaza. For nine weeks beginning March 18, 2013, attorneys from the Center for Constitutional Rights and their clients, some of who were themselves members of CPR member organizations, challenged the constitutionality of the NYPD's practice of stop-and-frisk of New York City residents. Inside and outside the courthouse, grassroots members of CPR highlighted the human impact of the practice.

**“It was a nine-week federal trial in New York City, and literally every single day for those nine weeks there were huge groups of community members in the courtroom audience from many communities from across the city that have suffered the consequence of discriminatory stop-and-frisk practices. It was powerful visually and had a direct impact on the way the court resolved the case—in particular, the reforms the court ordered.”**

– Darius Charney | Center for Constitutional Rights

Three stop-and-frisk cases were either moving through or had moved through the court system around the time of the election, and this played a part in CPR's strategy to leverage the legal activity. Of the three, *Floyd* was the broadest in scope. Originally filed in 2008 in response to the NYPD's noncompliance with the Daniels settlement and exponential growth in the number of unconstitutional stops-and-frisks, it focused on the unconstitutionality of stop-and-frisk citywide.

*Floyd* was poised to impact the CSA advocacy strategy. If the plaintiffs lost the case, it could negatively impact city councilmembers' perception of stop-and-frisk as a discriminatory practice that needed to be reformed. However, CPR viewed the litigation as an opportunity to raise awareness of the harms of stop-and-frisk and the pervasiveness of racial profiling.

The other two lawsuits against stop-and-frisk included *Ligon v. City of New York* and *Davis v. City of New York*. *Ligon*, the narrowest of the three lawsuits, had already gone to trial, and the plaintiffs had won. It focused on the use of stop-and-frisk by NYPD officers as part of the Operation Clean Halls Program, which was conducted in privately owned properties. The court ruled the practice “systematically” unconstitutional, and the city was found liable.<sup>69</sup> However, the court delayed the remedy until it could be consolidated with the *Floyd* remedy.

*Davis* focused on stop-and-frisk in city-owned housing projects. Attorneys for *Davis* decided to delay the trial until after the election because de Blasio had promised to settle the lawsuits if elected mayor.

“De Blasio had to make that statement in the climate that had been created,” said Johanna Steinberg of the Bronx Defenders. CPR's strategies heavily influenced their lawsuit. “Everything was playing off each other in a way that was not small. The success of CPR in making stop-and-frisk an issue in the mayoral campaign was instrumental.” The parties ultimately settled *Davis* after de Blasio became mayor, and the court included *Davis* in the monitoring process mandated as part of the decisions in *Floyd* and *Ligon*.

CPR was able to leverage the Floyd trial and ensure that, regardless of the trial's outcome, it placed a spotlight on the problem of discriminatory policing in New York City and its caustic effects on communities of color.

As CPR's coordinated strategy integrated the Floyd trial activities into the broader CSA campaign, it employed four key tactics:

1. Supporting the Litigation
2. Packing the court
3. Garnering media coverage associated with the trial
4. Linking to the CSA

## 1. Supporting the Litigation

CPR staff worked closely with the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a CPR member, to develop a strategy that wrapped around the trial. CPR provided the litigators access to experts and researchers, as well as community members who could provide testimony. Working closely with the litigators, CPR engaged and mobilized members on other tactics in support of the litigation.

- **The Plaintiffs** – Several of the plaintiffs in Floyd were from Malcolm X Grassroots Movement. They were an important link between the trial and the community – translating to the community what was occurring in the trial, its relevance to them, and the importance of rallying around the trial. Individuals directly affected by stop-and-frisk became centrally involved in the litigation in a variety of ways: as plaintiffs, in testimony, in press conferences, and in the remedy.
- **Amicus Briefs** - CPR filed three amicus briefs that demonstrated broad-based community support for the plaintiffs and for the reforms.
- **Connecting to the broader campaign** – By integrating the litigation into a multi-pronged strategy, CPR accomplished several things: 1) It magnified the litigation's impact by placing it within the broader campaign context; 2) It countered the bluntness of litigation as a stand-alone tactic; and 3) It made the trial a "movement event and not just a trial," said Kate Rubin of the Bronx Defenders.

## 2. Packing the Court

Each day of the trial, community members packed the courtroom, and at the end of the day, held a press conference on the courthouse steps. This tactic helped humanize stop-and-frisk and make real the toll this discriminatory practice exacted on people's lives. Also, the data being presented inside the courthouse provided evidence that Black and Latino men were systematically and disproportionately targeted for stop-and-frisk. But each day, a different group of community members attended, providing proof that those affected by profiling and discrimination extended well beyond that segment of the population.

For example, one day the focus was the residents of Brooklyn, the borough with the highest rate of stop-and-frisk. Brooklyn-based member organizations, community members, and elected officials packed the court, and then held a press conference to speak about the impact of NYPD's discriminatory policing practices on Brooklyn residents. On other days, groups representing indigent communities, residents of public housing, social workers, women, families, youth, the LGBTQ community, immigrants, and Muslim communities packed the court, then spoke to the press about their experience with stop-and-frisk. Each day brought a different community, a different face, and a different manifestation of the issue.

During testimony and the press conferences, the constituencies that made their voice heard during the Floyd trial amplified CPR's message:

- **The NYPD is on trial for the unconstitutional practice of stop-and-frisk**
- **Stop-and-frisk is a symptom of the larger problem of discriminatory policing in New York City**
- **A victory for the plaintiffs in Floyd will begin to remedy the problem**
- **To more broadly address the problem, we also need to pass the Community Safety Act**

**“The community voice amplified the litigation and made the case important. It showed the judge that this was a case that mattered, and that the plaintiffs were real. This was not challenging a practice in isolation, but a problem of racism in the country.”**

– **Chauniqua Young** | Center for Constitutional Rights

### 3. Garnering Media Coverage

CPR's comprehensive communications strategy undergirded all its organizing, legislative and legal advocacy work. It created the context for the various strategies. But for Floyd in particular, it:

1. Elevated the profile of and interest in the litigation
2. Tied the litigation into the broader narrative—stop-and-frisk was an unconstitutional practice that was making communities less safe
3. Placed the trial within the broader context of events—the elections, the silent march, the increasing media and public attention, and the advocacy for the CSA

CPR also disseminated reports from member organizations. For example, CCR developed “Stop-and-Frisk: The Human Impact,”<sup>70</sup> a report that told personal stories of New Yorkers who had been stopped-and-frisked. The report served as an organizing companion piece to the Floyd trial by humanizing the policy's impact outside the litigation's limited confines.

The campaign also used social media to connect New Yorkers to the events inside the courtroom. CCR created the hashtag, #NYPDonTrial, and CPR sent out shareable messages that highlighted research and data on the pervasive, racially targeted use of stop-and-frisk, testimony excerpts, and other material of interest to a broader audience. (See Figure 4 for examples of Tweets CPR sent out as part of this tactic.)

**“CPR was successful in shifting the debate on stop-and-frisk in New York City in the media and the way it was talked about in the halls of the City Council. That also had a direct impact on how the court viewed and decided the issue. The court's decision refers often to the media coverage of the issue and even directly mentions CPR and its work. The fact that CPR was so successful in shifting the debate had a positive effect on the way our case played out.”**

– **Darius Charney**  
Center for Constitutional Rights

FIGURE 4:



## #NYPDonTrial Sample Tweets

- **#NYPDonTrial expert study of 4.4 million stops finds blacks are significantly more likely to be stopped by #NYPD compared to whites**
- **#NYPDonTrial Columbia professor Jeffrey Fagan says NYPD stops produce fewer arrests “than what you would achieve by chance.” #stopandfrisk**
- **Ray Kelly wants #StopAndFrisk to “Instill fear” in minorities, State Senator testifies [bit.ly/Z4hIE3](https://bit.ly/Z4hIE3) #changetheNYPD #NYPDonTrial**
- **The#NYPD’s racist #StopAndFrisk policy is hemorrhaging support as facts come out #NYPDonTrial**
- **New York City Cop testifies that he was told to target young black men #NYPDonTrial**
- **Plaintiff Ourlicht asked for officers’ info, they responded, “Now you’re gonna get the full treatment, get against the wall.” #NYPDonTrial**
- **Judge to the #NYPD: “You reasonably suspect something and you’re wrong 90 percent of the time.” [Nyti.ms/10RK0hv](https://nyti.ms/10RK0hv) #stopandfrisk #NYPDonTrial**
- **CCR closing arguments #NYPDonTrial: “NYPD has laid siege to black and Latino neighborhoods, tossing constitutional requirements out the window”**
- **Federal judge rules stop-and-frisk unconstitutional. For more on the human impact: #NYPDonTrial**

### 4. Linking to the CSA

CPR intentionally leveraged the Floyd litigation for the advocacy and organizing around the CSA by linking it to both its’ inside and outside strategy. “We were coordinating to maximize the impact of Floyd, so we made it part of one conversation,” said Andrew Friedman. “We were very intentional about how to amplify what was happening in the litigation to support the policy fights.”

CPR kept its internal champions, councilmembers Lander and Williams, informed on the litigation’s progress, and helped them educate their colleagues about Floyd and its implications for the CSA. The campaign needed to be sure city councilmembers did not misconstrue a Floyd victory as the end of stop-and-frisk, negating the need for the CSA.

The decision in the Floyd trial came several weeks before the veto override vote on the CSA. CPR asserted Floyd was evidence of the need for the CSA, and the remedies the court ordered were only a partial solution. In fact, because the Floyd litigators were part of CPR, they informed the development of the legislative language for the CSA to ensure it could accomplish what Floyd could not. The Floyd victory gave CPR additional advocacy ammunition to use for the passage of the CSA:

- **It lent the weight of a decision by a Federal judge**
- **It “credentialed” stop-and-frisk as an unconstitutional and discriminatory practice**
- **It equated police “discretion” with discrimination**
- **It provided a rationale to city councilmembers as to why they should vote affirmatively for the CSA**
- **It provided cover to city councilmembers to support the CSA in a way that did not seem anti-NYPD**

## 5. The Decision

In the landmark decision on *Floyd v. City of New York*, a federal court found the NYPD's practice of stop-and-frisk unconstitutional. In a 198-page ruling, Judge Shira Scheindlin found the practice violates New Yorkers' Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and also found the racially discriminatory practices violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.<sup>71</sup> She noted the city had adopted a policy of "indirect racial profiling."

The judge ordered a court-appointed monitor to oversee a series of reforms to NYPD policing practices, and also ordered a Joint Remedial Process—a collective process to develop reforms and to solicit input from a variety of stakeholders, including New York communities most directly affected by policing, and CPR.

"It is rare, in litigation, to directly incorporate the perspectives of the victims of the discriminatory governmental practice into the remedies developed," said Darius Charney, the lead counsel on Floyd. "I think the court was willing to do it because the judge realized how much these different stakeholder groups were not only interested in these issues, but were willing to work on them."

"People in the affected communities owned the victory when the [Floyd] decision came down," Kang said.

**"We would not have won Floyd without CPR. The campaign worked to make stop-and-frisk a mayoral issue, and elevated it in the public discourse. CPR created the space for both Floyd and the CSA."**

— Nahal Zamani | Center for Constitutional Rights

**"In their organizing and press conferences, community groups continued to lift up the stop-and-frisk numbers and disparities, while at the same time, the other side of that message was the CSA and Floyd were a solution. CPR raised Floyd in the media and connected it to CSA."**

— Yul-san Liem | Justice Committee



“Reform campaigns make small changes. But as far as moving the dial, this campaign has done what no one has in the history of the NYPD.”

– Brett Stoult  
John Jay College of  
Criminal Justice, CUNY

## Campaign Findings

### 1. CPR took a movement building approach to its operations and strategy<sup>65,X</sup>

- **Led with Impacted Communities** – Fundamental to CPR was their central and unwavering focus on bringing impacted communities into every aspect of the coalition and campaign—its structure, operations, organizing, advocacy, and policy solutions. This focus was a core value and a strategy. Communities most affected were part of crafting and advocating for solutions that directly impacted them and additionally, communities formed the base and held the power to bring about and sustain change. Grassroots organizations were integrated at every level of the process, and were not treated as “ATMs” that produced large numbers of people at will. That meant campaign partners owned the strategy, prepared their communities, and rapidly mobilized when the time was right.
- **Built Capacity and Leadership of Grassroots Members** – By building the capacity and leadership of member organizations to engage in policy change, CPR provided access for community members—those directly impacted by discriminatory policing—to the “halls of power.” The grassroots organizations gained knowledge, skills, and confidence through the CSA campaign that they also applied to other issues of concern to their organizations. In addition, the victory itself empowered and catalyzed communities who long felt powerless in the face of an intransigent police department.
- **Promoted Cross-Issue Collaboration and Alliance Building** – CPR built alliances among its members and partners, creating a broad base of organizations and communities unified by their shared experience with and concern about police violence. For example, Muslim groups collaborated with LGBTQ groups, and each learned about the other’s shared, yet unique, experience with discriminatory policing. In addition, CPR strategically built alliances with power brokers such as labor and other institutions and organizations who were aligned on stop-and-frisk and the CSA, thereby strengthening the capacity of grassroots and community-based organizations. These alliances have also led to relationships and collaborations across a range of issues outside CPR’s focus area, the impact of which has reverberated within New York City’s social justice movement.
- **Formed a Connective Infrastructure** – CPR created a structure that 1) centralized the communications capacity and connected and coordinated strategies across the campaign to ensure each was informing the other and having a synergistic effect, 2) ensured impacted communities were brought into the discussion on every level; 3) amplified the voices of many diverse populations that comprise the base of the coalition; and 4) connected the grassroots base to “treetops” organizations—the larger legislative and legal advocacy organizations—so they could coordinate. CPR did a particularly good job of neutralizing the power differential between grassroots organizations and the larger legal and advocacy organizations.
- **Built and Leveraged Power** – Overall, what CPR accomplished can be summed up as building power and exercising that power to take on the NYPD and bring about historic reforms. With affected communities forming the base of power, CPR leveraged its broad multi-sector members to strengthen and consolidate power.

X. Masters and Osborne describe five elements of movement building: 1) authentic base and base building, 2) collaborative leadership, 3) vision and ideas—a common narrative that inspires and connects people, 4) alliances, and 5) advocacy infrastructure. As a coalition, CPR did not have the breadth of vision and ideas that movements embody, however, it did reflect other important aspects of movement building.

## 2. CPR created their moment by forcing open a “window of opportunity” for the passage of the CSA<sup>73,XI</sup>

- **Framed the Problem and Changed the Narrative** – Using data obtained as a result of the Daniels settlement, CPR demonstrated the magnitude of stop-and-frisk, its systematic racial bias, and its ineffectiveness in retrieving weapons, reducing crime, and creating safety. CPR then humanized the harm that stop-and-frisk was creating by having its members tell their stories. The messaging then redefined stop-and-frisk as a practice that makes ALL people and communities LESS safe. The exponential rise of stop-and-frisk numbers had drawn attention to the problem, creating the opportunity to use the issue as an entry point to addressing police reform and holding the NYPD accountable.
- **Developed a Policy Solution** – CPR drafted the bill language for the CSA, which, as originally developed, was a package of four bills. The ambitious legislation extended beyond stop-and-frisk. In particular, the anti-discrimination bill expanded protection to a broader category of individuals and provided them with a cause of action. CPR, in collaboration with their partners on the City Council, took a phased approach and advanced the two bills they perceived as having the greatest political viability at that particular historic moment. Instead of going with all or nothing, they took an incremental approach.
- **Understood and Leveraged the Politics** – CPR leveraged the factors in the political and policy environment to their advantage to create the political will for the CSA. This included the mayoral and city council elections, electoral organizing, and leveraging multiple lawsuits to elevate the profile of the issue, educate on its impact, change the narrative, and influence decision makers.

## 3. CPR had the capacity or “readiness” to achieve its goal with an understanding of the challenges, obstacles, and opponents, and what will be needed to overcome them.

- **Set Aside Adequate Time for Planning** – CPR took six months to plan and develop their infrastructure before they launched. During that time, they developed a mission and goals, shared policy agenda, unity principles, and guiding documents; built a knowledge base on the issue and how to approach it; and scoped the problem and the political landscape.
- **Developed a Comprehensive Strategy** – CPR understood no single strategy would bring about police reform, so they developed an appropriate, coordinated, integrated, multi-sector, multi-pronged campaign that included organizing, legal and legislative advocacy, communications, and research.
- **Created a Multi-Sector Commitment to Shared Objectives** – CPR needed a broad base of support to defeat the powerful well-resourced organized interests defending stop-and-frisk. No single constituency could have addressed stop-and-frisk alone. The base reflected the wide range of populations impacted by discriminatory policing, representing a broad swath of New Yorkers from across the city’s boroughs.
- **Centralized Campaign Staff** – CPR created a central campaign hub that included staff to coordinate, share information, manage the working groups, and provide resources and technical assistance. In addition, this hub centralized some functions, including capacity building and communications, to ensure all members were connected and had access to them.
- **Resources** – CPR received vital financial support for its formation, operations and staff, and campaign work. An effort this broad could not have been undertaken without significant resources. In addition, resources for the range of CPR’s tactics and strategies, as well as availability of 501(c)4 dollars, was critical in helping them engage in the electoral organizing and lobbying required to hold the needed votes for the CSA veto override as well as take on powerful organized interests. Elected officials took the campaign more seriously because they saw how it could impact them electorally. As some political scientists have noted, that policy entrepreneurs with more resources—i.e. the ability to spend more time, money, and energy to push their proposals—have greater rates of success.<sup>74</sup>

XI. Kingdon’s “Agenda Setting” or “Policy Window” theory posits that the confluence of at least two of the three “streams”—problems, policies, and politics—creates a window of opportunity to advance a policy issue. CPR brought together all three streams to advance the CSA.

#### 4. CPR integrated and leveraged the litigation to mobilize its members, elevate the profile of stop-and-frisk abuses, and advocate for the CSA<sup>XII</sup>

- **Integrating Litigation as Part of Multi-Pronged Strategy** – CPR integrated and leveraged the Floyd litigation by supporting and amplifying the trial as part of its multi-pronged strategy that included organizing and advocacy to pass the CSA. CPR supported the litigators by providing direct access to a range of experts, including community members and researchers, on which they could draw for information and testimony. CPR also packed the courts to ensure the judge saw the faces of people affected by stop-and-frisk. Those faces impressed upon the judge how important it was to include impacted communities in any reforms handed down from the bench. By including those communities and members of CPR as she developed the remedies, the judge addressed one of the weaknesses inherent in the use of litigation for social reform: the enforcement of the decision. Legal advocates could not have accomplished this on their own.
- **Creating the Context for the Litigation** – CPR’s broader narrative and communications strategy enveloped the litigation. The trial occurred in the context of a range of other activities and actions CPR used to spotlight stop-and-frisk—the mayoral and city council elections, the silent march, the votes on the CSA, and the increasing media attention on the issue. Several litigators described CPR’s role as creating the “space,” or the environment, in which the litigation became possible. With CPR’s help, the litigation became part of the existing narrative being advanced on stop-and-frisk and discriminatory policing.
- **Litigation to Mobilization** – CPR created and leveraged the “secondary” or indirect effects of the Floyd litigation.<sup>75</sup> The Floyd trial coincided with both CSA votes. The courthouse joined City Hall and the city councilmember’s districts as a third focal point of the ground campaign, providing a daily stage from which CPR members could “dramatize” the reach and devastating impact of stop-and-frisk, and advocate for the passage of the CSA. The trial provided an ongoing opportunity to build public and political will for the CSA. CPR integrated their work around Floyd into the communication strategy, and added to the overall drumbeat against stop-and-frisk that was steadily growing louder in New York City. Moreover, the litigation ultimately endowed the issue with the legal credibility of a federal court—stop-and-frisk had been ruled unconstitutional. CPR used this as support for their argument to city councilmembers for the passage of the CSA.
- **Participating Throughout the Legal Process** – CPR understood they could support and leverage three parts of the legal process: the identification of the plaintiffs, the trial, and the enforcement of the decision. Legal advocates and community groups built on the Daniels experience to ensure people affected by stop-and-frisk served as plaintiffs for Floyd and informed and helped enforce the remedy. CPR provided increased support during the trial and, later, in the remedial process.

XII. Legal mobilization theory tries to understand legal action within the context of the development of a movement, and to assess the role of litigation relative to other tactical options. Legal mobilization focuses on the indirect or secondary effects of litigation, the efficacy and role of litigation as part of a multi-pronged advocacy effort, and the important role of rights when building a movement.

## Challenges

Challenges are par for the course in policy change efforts. Like any campaign, CPR faced obstacles along the way. The following are some of the challenges faced:

- **Scope of Issue** – From its inception, CPR saw stop-and-frisk as a ripe policy opportunity that could begin to address the bigger, discriminatory aspects of broken windows policing, which is one of the preconditions leading to the school-to-prison pipeline, economic inequity, and other issues. However, tensions arose regarding whether to focus on stop-and-frisk or the broader issue of broken windows and discriminatory policing. The challenge is to balance real policy progress and political viability while not ignoring the more complex issues at hand.
- **Learning and Assessing Progress** – Once launched, work on the many moving pieces of the multi-pronged campaign occurred at lightning speed, creating little time for reflection and assessment of progress. Progress was obvious in some instances, but in other situations, it was subtler. The intentional creation of opportunities for reflection, assessment, and learning across the campaign may have informed their strategy. A campaign needs to systematically plan for assessment and learning time, or it won't happen.
- **Capacity** – Though CPR was well resourced, it was still David to the opposition's Goliath. As a result, CPR and its members worked intensely and beyond capacity for close to three years. However, it was critical that foundations provided resources for campaign staff, as well as the grassroots organizations, which otherwise would not have been able to participate and engage their members in the ways they did.
- **Maintaining Engagement** – CPR engaged more than 100 non-CPR member organizations in support of the CSA. That advocacy work built great relationships, but now the challenge is to maintain those relationships and keep these partners engaged in the CSA and other related advocacy efforts. In addition delays in the Floyd reform process because of Bloomberg's attempts to repeal the decision delayed progress.
- **Policing Alternatives** – CPR very effectively elevated stop-and-frisk as an ineffective and harmful discriminatory policing practice. Yet some policymakers noted the need for alternatives to the practice—positive models and policies for effective community policing as well as alternative approaches to train new recruits while working to reform the system they will enter into. Some community groups have suggested creating community safety models that do not include the NYPD. And others suggested it would be most simple for the NYPD to adopt a consistent approach—in other words, the way they police the Upper West Side should be the way they police all other parts of the city.

# Postscript

Since the passage of the CSA and the Floyd ruling, CPR has continued to advocate for further police reforms. As of 2015, CPR was still fighting to pass the two other bills that comprised the original CSA, now called 'The Right To Know Act.'

On the state level, CPR has successfully advocated with families whose loved ones were killed by police violence and brutality to establish a special prosecutor for police-related civilian deaths. In July 2015, Governor Andrew Cuomo issued an executive order authorizing a special prosecutor within the office of the New York State Attorney General.<sup>76</sup>

In fall 2014, the stay lifted on the Floyd ruling, and the joint remedial process began. The court appointed retired Judge Ariel Belen to work with the parties to design and facilitate the process.<sup>77</sup>

CPR's efforts to reform stop-and-frisk have resulted in a dramatic decline in reported stops. However, in his first report to the court, the Floyd monitor noted police are under-reporting. Communities are still reporting being stopped by police, and the data shows unchanged racial disparities around who is stopped.

**“There is a cross-fertilization occurring across issues, and people are showing up for each other and our campaigns. We are even more connected because of CPR to move campaigns in New York City. It has elevated our visibility and our work. We are not working in isolation, but thinking about how we work in a movement.”**

— [Cara Page](#) | Audre Lorde Project

## The Right To Know Act

- **Protect New Yorkers against unlawful searches** (Intro. 541) would end the practice of the NYPD deceiving New Yorkers into consenting to unnecessary searches; requires officers to explain a person has the right to refuse a search when there is no warrant or probable cause; and requires officers to obtain proof of consent to a search.
- **Require officers to identify and explain themselves to the public** (Intro 182) would require officers to provide the specific reason for their law enforcement activity, such as a stop-and-frisk; and would require officers to provide the officer's name, rank, command, and a phone number for the Civilian Complaint Board at the end of police encounters that do not result in an arrest or summons.

“We never thought the issue of stop-and-frisk would end in a year or two,” Kang said. “It’s going to take time, and there are other enforcement activities that are just as pernicious in terms of racial and discriminatory profiling.”

Passing the CSA was incredibly challenging, but sustaining that win will take even longer, and will require just as much work. This is the nature of policy and systems change. Moreover, that work is exponentially more difficult when working within the NYPD's closed system and entrenched culture.

Since the events of 2013, the context for CPR's work has changed dramatically. Several high profile incidents of police violence that resulted in the death of the individuals elevated the issue of discriminatory policing practices and police brutality to national dialogue.

In July 2014, Eric Garner was killed in Staten Island after a police officer placed him in a chokehold for selling individual cigarettes on the street – a broken windows offense. Eric Garner gasped, “I can’t breathe,” eleven times before dying. New York City erupted in protest when the officer was not indicted. CPR helped create a new short-term coalition called This Stops Today, which also included Million Hoodies and Freedom Side. On their website, This Stops Today issued eleven demands and launched eleven days of action listed by date, time, and location. The coalition used Twitter hashtags #ThisStopsToday and #ICantBreathe to organize social media messaging, and more than 20,000 people took to the streets on December 4 for a day of action.

“Because CPR existed already, we were ready for new challenges,” said Alyssa Aguilera, Political Director of VOCAL-NY. “This Stops Today and the eleven days of action perfectly encapsulate what CPR can do. The texture and the nuance of our response exemplified the coalition and its relationships.”

CPR and its staff provided an infrastructure to organizations in New York working on police accountability that allowed them to quickly organize and mobilize in a new, sustained way. “Before CPR provided support, we could swell up around an incident, and could push the needle with each incident,” said Bandele. “But it wasn’t sustainable, because we did not have the glue and the consistency of a staff.”

Shortly after the death of Eric Garner, two police officers were shot in Brooklyn, which swung the pendulum of public sentiment away from police reform. CPR and other activists moved forward with their already-scheduled protest, despite criticism. The campaign knew the context would shift and change with every new incident. The political context in New York has also changed, and CPR now faces new challenges. DeBlasio, who was elected because of his stance against stop-and-frisk, has tried to find a middle ground with the NYPD. He returned William Bratton, the initiator of the broken windows policing approach within the department, to the Commissioner’s seat, and hired 1,000 new police officers.

Beyond New York, numerous high profile police violence cases, including the deaths of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Mo., and Freddie Gray in Baltimore, have turned the nation’s attention to racial profiling and police brutality. Networks such as Black Lives Matter have emerged from community action around these incidents, and there is increased attention on and public awareness of police violence and a need for accountability and reforms.

However, a seismic political shift has occurred on the national level. A divisive 2016 presidential cycle, which politicized issues of policing by pitting black lives against “blue” or police lives, created a polarized electorate. The election of Donald Trump, the candidate who touted the use of stop-and-frisk as a means to restore law and order, to the presidency has created uncertainty and concern for those working to combat unjust police practices. However, this is not a wholly unfamiliar circumstance. CPR, activists, and funders can draw upon their post 9/11 experiences and lessons learned—hold ground to protect progress while continuing to organize and build to be ready for strategic opportunities to advance criminal justice reforms. CPR has already demonstrated what is possible in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles.

**“We are at an even more critical moment when it comes to policing, and we have the potential for a powerful movement that addresses issues of policing and broader criminal justice issues. Black Lives Matter is pushing the envelope with their demands. CPR has moved the needle in NYC and shown what is possible. The funders need to recognize this moment and quickly seize on it, because moments like this don’t last forever, and the opportunity to bring about change will go by the wayside.”**

– **Kica Matos** | formerly with  
The Atlantic Philanthropies

# Appendices

**Appendix A** 56

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Communities United for Police Reform Members

**Appendix B** 58

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Interview List

**Appendix C** 59

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Glossary

# Appendix A

## Voting Members

Arab American Association of New York  
The Audre Lorde Project  
Brooklyn Movement Center\*  
The Bronx Defenders  
The Center for Popular Democracy  
Center for Constitutional Rights\*  
Color of Change  
CAAAY Organizing Asian Communities  
Desis Rising Up & Moving  
Drug Policy Alliance  
FIERCE  
Girls for Gender Equity  
Jews for Racial & Economic Justice  
Justice Committee\*  
Latino Justice PRLDEF  
The Legal Aid Society  
Make the Road New York\*  
Malcolm X Grassroots Movement\*  
Marijuana Arrests Research Project  
NAACP-Legal Defense and Education Fund  
New York City Anti-Violence Project\*  
New York Civil Liberties Union\*  
NY Communities for Change  
Peoples' Justice for Community Control and Police Accountability  
Picture the Homeless\*  
The Public Science Project\*  
Rockaway Youth Task Force  
Streetwise and Safe  
VOCAL-NY  
Youth Ministries for Peace and Justice  
Youth Represent

(Voting Members as of November 2016)

\*Denotes organizations serving on CPR's Steering Committee at the time of publication



## Supporting Members

5 Borough Defenders

Asian American Legal Defense & Education Fund

Association of Legal Aid Attorneys/UAW Local 2325

Astraea Lesbian Foundation for Justice

Black Women's Blueprint

The Brotherhood/Sister Sol

Campaign to Stop the False Arrests

Child Welfare Organizing Project

Citizen Action of NY

Community Voices Heard

Council on American-Islamic Relations - New York

Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility

Criminal Justice Clinic at Pace Law School

Defending Rights & Dissent

El Puente

Families for Freedom

Gay Men of African Descent

Game Changers Project

Immigrant Defense Project

Interfaith Center of New York

Jews Against Islamophobia

Katal Center for Health, Equity, and Justice

Manhattan Young Democrats

New York Harm Reduction Educators (NYHRE)

Northern Manhattan Coalition for Immigrant Rights

Persist Health Project

PROS Network

Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York

Sistas & Brothas United/ Northwest Bronx Community & Clergy Coalition

Sylvia Rivera Law Project

Tribeca for Change

Trinity Lutheran Church

T'ruah: the Rabbinic Call for Human Rights

Turning Point for Women and Families

# Appendix B: Interview List

Alyssa Aguilera	VOCAL-NY
Fahad Ahmed	Desis Rising Up and Moving
Lumumba Akinwale-Bandele	NAACP LDF
Monifa Bandele	Malcolm X Grassroots Movement
Anmarie Benedict	The Atlantic Philanthropies
Lillie Carino	1199 SEIU
Jen Carnig	New York Civil Liberties Union
Juan Cartagena	Latino Justice
Darius Charney	Center for Constitutional Rights
Cheryl Contee	Fission Strategies
Cathy Dang	CAAAY
Andrew Friedman	Center for Popular Democracy
Robert Gangi	Urban Justice Center
William Gibney	Legal Aid Society
Priscilla Gonzalez	Communities United for Police Reform
Alison Hirsh	32BJ SEIU
Mandela Jones	Communities United for Police Reform
Joo-Hyun Kang	Communities United for Police Reform
Brad Lander	New York City Councilmember
Jin Hee Lee	NAACP LDF
Zachary Lerner	New York Communities for Change
Harry Levine	The Marijuana Arrests Research Project
Lynn Lewis	Picture The Homeless
Yul-San Liem	Justice Committee
Julian Liu	32BJ SEIU
Kica Matos	Center for Community Change (formerly The Atlantic Philanthropies)
Jen Nessel	Center for Constitutional Rights
Udi Ofer	New Jersey Civil Liberties Union (formerly New York Civil Liberties Union)
Cara Page	Audre Lorde Project
Cori Parrish	North Star Fund
Aidge Patterson	Peoples Justice
Terrance Pitts	Open Society Foundations
Andrea Ritchie	Streetwise and Safe
Rashad Robinson	Color of Change
Kate Rubin	Bronx Defenders
Linda Sarsour	Arab American Association of NY
Gabriel Sayegh	Drug Policy Alliance
Loren Seigel	The Marijuana Arrests Research Project
Marbre Stahly-Butts	Center for Popular Democracy
Sharon Stapel	NYC Anti-Violence Project
Johanna Steinberg	Bronx Defenders (Formerly NAACP LDF)
Brett Stoudt, PhD	John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY
Javier Valdes	Make the Road New York
Manny Vaz	Communities United for Police Reform
Chauniqua Young	Outten & Golden LLP (formerly Center for Constitutional Rights)
Nahal Zamani	Center for Constitutional Rights

## Appendix C: Glossary

CAPB: Coalition Against Police Brutality

CSA: Community Safety Act

CCR: Center for Constitutional Rights

CPR: Communities United for Police Reform

MXGM: Malcolm X Grassroots Movement

NYCLU: New York Civil Liberties Union

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